o the Editor:
A Nov. 25 front-page article says that "tracking Iraq's
nuclear weapons sites is considered less complicated because
of the radioactivity they emit and because the United Nations
compiled a detailed picture of Iraq's program in the early
1990's."
Unfortunately, key technologies like centrifuges to enrich
uranium for bombs release little detectable radiation.
Fabrication of nonnuclear components for bombs, like
high-explosive lenses, emits no radioactivity.
Before 1998, inspectors dismantled much of Iraq's bomb
program. But significant issues remain unresolved: Iraq's bomb
designs and nuclear-weapon components, for example, are still
missing.
The greatest risk is Saddam Hussein's smuggling in bomb
material stolen from civil or military programs, which the
International Atomic Energy Agency concedes it has very little
chance of detecting.
The only fail-safe approach is to halt production and use
of plutonium and highly enriched uranium worldwide.
Bomb-usable nuclear materials are too dangerous for civilian
commerce.
STEVEN DOLLEY
Washington, Nov. 25,
2002
The writer is research director, Nuclear Control
Institute.
