Iran Had Secret Nuclear Program, U.N. Agency Says
'No Evidence' of Arms Plans; Probe Continues

By Joby Warrick and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, November 11, 2003; Page A01

Iran manufactured small amounts of enriched uranium and plutonium as part of a nuclear program that operated in secret for 18 years, according to a confidential report by a U.N. agency. The report harshly criticizes Iran for deliberately hiding evidence of its nuclear program from international inspectors and for numerous "breaches" in its nuclear treaty obligations.

The 29-page report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says there is "no evidence" so far that Iran had sought to build a nuclear bomb, as asserted by the Bush administration, but the U.N. watchdog said it would keep investigating this claim. Given Iran's "past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes," the report says.

The report's catalogue of Iran's nuclear activities shows that the Islamic republic had made significant strides in a program that until last year was barely understood by the outside world. The report, obtained by The Washington Post, documents numerous occasions when Iranian officials altered or reversed their explanations after being challenged by investigators or with conflicting evidence.

"Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge program, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment program," the report says, referring to two of the leading technologies for making fissile material for nuclear power plants or weapons. "In that context Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU [low-enriched uranium], using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes . . . and a small amount of plutonium."

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes.

The report says that Iran made the plutonium between 1988 and 1992 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, a laboratory in the capital. Iran said the plutonium was produced during experiments intended to "gain experience in reprocessing chemistry," the IAEA report says. The equipment used in the experiment was dismantled in 1992.

While the amount of plutonium produced was likely minuscule -- far less than needed for a nuclear weapon -- Iran had previously denied conducting any such experiments. Plutonium production is generally associated only with nuclear weapons programs.

The IAEA report was delivered to the 35 member nations of the agency's Board of Governors, which will meet Nov. 20 to decide whether Iran should be declared in violation of its nuclear treaty obligations. At that meeting, the report will be weighed against new signs that Iran has decided to come clean about its past and cooperate with nuclear inspectors.

As the report was being finalized, Iran formally announced several measures intended to ease international concerns about its nuclear intentions. In a letter hand-delivered to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, Iran agreed to snap inspections and unfettered access to its nuclear facilities under an enhanced safeguards agreement called the "Additional Protocol."

The letter also states Iran's commitment to suspend uranium enrichment for an unspecified period. Iran agreed in principle to the tougher inspections and suspension last month as part of a diplomatic initiative led by Germany, Britain and France. Yesterday, ElBaradei praised the Iranian move as "a welcome and positive development."

After meeting with ElBaradei on Saturday, Hassan Rouhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said in a statement that Iran was "determined to make sure that the international community is assured of the peaceful nature of its program."

The IAEA report, in assessing Iran's past practices, says the country had repeatedly breached its nuclear safeguard agreements under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a signatory. "Based on all the information currently available to the [IAEA], it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations," the report says.

"Iran's policy of concealment continued until last month, with cooperation being limited and reactive and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory," the report says. "While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing."

The report notes that although the material would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, "the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner . . . has given rise to serous concerns."

Because of that previous concealment, the report says, it is critical that Iran agree to a "particularly robust" verification program of surprise inspections and frequent, intrusive monitoring.

In documents turned over to the IAEA last month, Iran presented a picture of its nuclear history that contrasts sharply with earlier pronouncements. After repeatedly denying having enriched uranium, Iran acknowledged in the documents that it enriched a small amount in 1999 and 2000 at Kalaye, a pilot plant Iran once described as a watch factory. Highly enriched uranium can be used in weapons.

Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had built a pilot plant to enrich uranium using lasers, something the IAEA had suspected for months. The plant had been dismantled, and soil from the site trucked away, by the time IAEA inspectors visited it last summer.

Weapons experts described the report as deeply troubling, mostly because of the disclosures about how Iran hid its activities from nuclear inspectors.

"It's quite clear now that Iran was engaged in willful and systematic deception over more than a decade," said Michael Levi, a science fellow at the Brookings Institution. "It's a damning report, and the IAEA should be given full credit for its persistence in exposing" the dishonesty.

While encouraged by Iran's recent candor, former IAEA inspector David Albright said he remained suspicious that Iran's leaders still had not told the full truth, especially about possible weapons research.

"Iran has admitted to activities that the IAEA had suspected had occurred, back in the spring of 2003. It may be guessing what it thinks the IAEA already knows," said Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. "Overall, Iran's cooperation is a good sign, because it shows that a combination of pressure and incentives is leading to real results. But by no means can you have confidence that the whole picture is known."

Key questions about Iran's past nuclear activity remained unresolved. For example, IAEA inspectors still were not convinced by Iran's explanations for why traces of highly enriched uranium were found at two Iranian facilities during IAEA tests last summer. Iran has acknowledged making only low-enriched uranium, which cannot be used in weapons without further refinement. Iranian officials say the particles of highly enriched uranium came with used nuclear equipment that Iran imported from another, still-unnamed country. Iran has acknowledged purchasing sensitive parts from numerous countries, often using front companies or black-market dealers.