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February 26, 2004
The Honorable Nils J. Diaz, Chairman Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
One
11555 Rockville Pike Dear Chairman Diaz, We are writing with
regard to the request by Nordion, Inc. for the remaining, second tranche of 15
kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the fourth amendment to export
license XSNM 03171, for production of medical isotopes at its NRU reactor and
associated processing facility in As you know, the
Nuclear Control Institute has never previously opposed export of HEU for
targets for production of medical isotopes at the NRU, despite the fact that
HEU can be used for weapons and despite the restrictions on such exports in the
1992 Energy Policy Act (Schumer Amendment).
This is because isotope production at the NRU was portrayed by Nordion
as only a short-term bridge until the commencement of isotope production at However, recent
information indicates that, at least since September 2003, Nordion has ceased
all cooperation, work, and intention towards converting the MAPLE facilities
from HEU targets to LEU targets. This
includes a halt to cooperation with the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory, a
fact that the Commission can and should confirm independently. Nordion informed We remind you that NCI
warned the Commission five years ago that, if the NPF were not converted prior
to start-up, its conversion costs would escalate and this would be cited as an
excuse not to convert.[1] Accordingly, we urged that the NPF be
converted prior to start-up. Nordion
rejected this option at the time on the ostensible grounds that immediately
converting the facility would interrupt the supply of isotopes by delaying the
start-up of the NPF beyond what Nordion claimed was an imminent and unavoidable
end to production at the NRU for technical reasons. The fact that production at the NRU continues
five years later proves that this earlier excuse not to convert was specious,
as we warned at the time.[2] In fact, Nordion never has wanted to convert
to LEU targets, but only has feigned interest, and offered bogus claims that it
was unable to convert, in order to continue receiving HEU from the The more the
Commission acquiesces to such chicanery from Nordion, the more it is likely
that Nordion never will convert and instead will request and receive HEU in
perpetuity, thereby unnecessarily raising the risk that some of this material
will be diverted for weapons by terrorists.
Moreover, tolerating Nordions recalcitrance could undermine efforts to
persuade other isotope producers to phase out HEU, multiplying the risk several-fold. We therefore request that you communicate
to Nordion, in the strongest possible terms, that unless it resumes cooperation
with the United States towards expeditious conversion to LEU targets, it will
obstruct its ability to receive any further exports of HEU from the United States. We also urge you to underscore to Nordion
that there is currently excess global production capacity for medical isotopes,
including among producers who already rely on or are converting to LEU targets,
so that if Nordions production were to be hindered, other producers quickly
could make up the difference and Nordion could lose its share of the U.S.
isotope market, possibly irreparably. We are not in a position at
this time to evaluate Nordions reported claim that a second processing line
would cost $90 million, but we would highlight several points. First, Nordion could have avoided any
possible need for a second processing line by converting the first one prior to
start-up as we argued to Nordion and the Commission at the time. Nordion chose not to do so and therefore
should bear all responsibility and cost for the consequences. Second, NCI specifically asked at a public
meeting of the Commission how Nordion intended to convert its processing line
after start-up, but Nordion repeatedly indicated it had a plan to do so. It now appears that Nordion simply lied
before the Commission. Third, if the
cost of a second processing line indeed were $90 million, this cost would have
to be viewed in light of the total cost of the MAPLE facilities, which already
include two purpose-built reactors and one new processing facility, and in
light of the market price of isotopes over the lifetime of the facility. From this perspective, even a cost of $90
million should not be viewed as prohibitive or exceeding the requirements of
the Schumer Amendment, especially given that Nordion could have reduced this
cost substantially by converting prior to start-up. Finally, it is quite possible that Nordion
intends to build a second processing line in any case, to provide redundancy
against problems at the first, just as it built two identical reactors. If so, the marginal expense of converting the
second line would be minimal. Nordion deliberately took
actions that increased the cost of converting its facility to LEU, and now
claims an exemption from conversion because the costs are too high. This is tantamount to the classic case of the
child who kills his parents, then asks the court for mercy because he is an
orphan. The Commission should not
tolerate such specious logic, intended to avoid accountability and the law. We urge you to take the
above-requested action to enforce the letter and spirit of the Schumer
Amendment. We stand ready to provide
further information upon request. Thank
you for your consideration. Sincerely, Alan J. Kuperman Paul L.
Leventhal Senior Policy
Analyst Founding
President cc: NRC Commissioners Senator Charles E. Schumer John R. Bolton, Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
[1] See Transcript, Public Meeting, Briefing on Proposed Export of
High Enriched Uranium to Canada, U.S. NRC, June 16, 1999, p. 86, where Alan
Kuperman testified: If you start up the
new processing facility with HEU, make it hot and then the producer says,
well, we can't shut it down to convert it to LEU because that will interrupt
the supply of medical isotopes, then you have gone down the HEU path and you
are on that path in perpetuity. The
following year, he explained to Nordion and the Commission that, if you made
modifications prior to startup, it would be, one, less expensive and, two, it
would avoid the problem of interrupting production of isotopes, as compared
with trying to make those modifications after the startup of the
facility. See Transcript, Public
Meeting, Briefing on Proposed Export of High Enriched Uranium to [2] See Transcript, June 16, 1999, p. 91, where Paul Leventhal testified: There is a question of fact here as to how long the NRU processing facility is available because of a supposedly filled waste tank or a waste tank that is going to be filled by the end of the year 2000, and, again, we think you should independently establish that situation. See also, pp. 62-63.
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