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Full-Scope
IAEA Safeguards as a Global Norm |
Basic NPT Obligation (Applies to 183
non-nuclear-weapon states):
“1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards
system . . .
Article III, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
“Basic Undertaking” of NPT Safeguards Agreement, in
INFCIRC/153:
“1.The Agreement should contain, in accordance
with Article III.l of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards,
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its
control anywhere, for the exclusive
purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.”
“The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153, June 1972.
NPT States Parties Endorse
Full-Scope Safeguards (1995 NPTREC):
"12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of
source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a
necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and
internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices."
Paragraph 12 of “Decision 2:
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament,” 1995 NPT Extension Treaty, NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2.
NPT States Parties Reaffirm
Full-Scope Safeguards (2000 NPT RevCon):
The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decision of the1995
Review and Extension Conference entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament”, noting paragraph 1 of the principles and
objectives and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in
particular paragraphs 9 to 13 and 17 to19, and to article VII of the
Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5 to 7.
[…]
The
Conference remains … urges all four States not parties to the Treaty, Cuba,
India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to it without delay and without
conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards
agreements, together with Additional Protocols consistent with the Model
contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).
Final Document, 2000 NPT Review
Conference, NPT/CONF.2000/28, Vol. 1, Part. 1.
Final Declaration, 1985 NPT RevCon
“The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation and in their nuclear export policies and, specifically as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to achieve that objective.”
Final Declaration (agreed by consensus), NPT Review
Conference, 1985.
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September
2004):
Affirms the
urgent need for all States in the
GC(48)/RES/16, September 2004.
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September
2004)
3. Bearing
in mind the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency’s safeguards
system, urges all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive
safeguards agreements to do so as soon
as possible
GC(48)/RES/14, September 2004.
IAEA Report on Strengthening Safeguards
(August 2004)
24. Even
though the dramatic increase in States with additional protocols actually in
force is a positive
development, more needs to be done. By 16 July 2004, more than seven years
after the Board approved the Model
Additional Protocol, 108 States – including 17 with known significant
nuclear activities - have yet to sign
additional protocols, while 25 States - including 12 with significant
nuclear activities - have signed
additional protocols but still need to bring these into force. Out of the States party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 43 have yet to bring
into force comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the Agency pursuant to that Treaty. For the IAEA safeguards system to be able to provide
credible assurance regarding both the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities, it must be given the requisite authority. This will require that all
States having made non-proliferation commitments - in particular those with significant nuclear
activities - bring into force and implement the legal instruments of the strengthened safeguards system.
GC(49)/11,
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September 2003):
3. Bearing
in mind the importance of achieving the universal application of the
Agency’s safeguards system, urges all States which have yet to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible;
GC(47)/RES/11
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September 2002):
3. Bearing in mind
the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency’s
safeguards system, urges all States which have yet to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible;
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September 2001):
3. Bearing in mind
the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency’s
safeguards system, urges all States which have yet to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible;
GC(45)/RES/13
IAEA General Conference Resolution (September 2000):
7. Urges
those non-nuclear-weapon States which have yet to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible;
GC(44)/RES/19
IAEA General Conference,
Resolution (September 1998):
2. Calls upon the States concerned to implement resolution 1172 (1998) of the Security Council of the United Nations;
3. Calls upon the States
concerned to conclude promptly, consistent with their safeguards commitments
and pending their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the additional protocols as called for by resolution GC(41)/RES/16;
4. Urges all States that have not yet done so,
particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to
become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
place all their nuclear material and facilities under comprehensive Agency
safeguards as required by that Treaty, and to become Parties to the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without delay and without conditions …
GC(42)/RES/19
UN Security Council
Presidential Statement (1992)
“On nuclear proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of
many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasize the
integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA
safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls.”
UN
Security Council, Declaration by Heads of State on Disarmament, Arms Control,
and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981)
Calls upon
UN
Security Council Resolution 487, adopted unanimously,
Full-Scope Safeguards in the Tlatelolco Treaty
“Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral
or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities.”
Article 13
Full-Scope Safeguards in the Pelindaba Treaty
“1. The safeguards referred to in subparagraph (b) of the article 9 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the Agency on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.”
Annex II
Full-Scope Safeguards in the
Each State Party which has not done so shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full scope safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities not later than eighteen months after the entry into force for that State Party of this Treaty.
Article 5.
Full-Scope Safeguards in the
1. The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
Annex II
[…]
Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT ...”.
Article 4
UNGA Res 59/76 (2004)
Welcoming the steady increase in the number of States that have signed
and/or concluded additional protocols to their International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards agreements in recent
years, and sharing the hope that the Agency’s
safeguards system will be further strengthened through the
universalization of safeguards
agreements and the additional protocols,
Welcomes the adoption of resolution GC(48)/RES/14 on 24 September 2004 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 in which it is recommended that States members of the Agency continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September 2000 by the General Conference of the Agency, 9 and in the Agency’s updated plan of action of February 2004, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;
Path
to Total Eliminaton of Nuclear Weapons, 3 Dec 04
UNGA Resolution 59/106
(2004)
Mindful of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the
region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, …
2. Reaffirms the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 5 and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East; 3. Calls upon that State to accede to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;
UNGA
Res 59/106 (3 Dec 04)
UNGA Resolution 56/24 N (
11. Welcomes the adoption and stresses the importance of resolution
GC(45)/RES/13, adopted on 21 September 2001 by the General Conference of
the International Atomic Energy Agency in which it is recommended that the
Director General of the Agency, its Board of Governors and member States
continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined
in resolution GC(44)/RES/19,6 adopted on 22 September 2000 by the General
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to promote and
facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and
additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that
resolution; …
New Agenda
Resolutions:
“9. Also calls upon those States that have
not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to
their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the
Board of Governors of the Agency on
“Towards
a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need
for a New Agenda,” UNGA Res. 53/77 Y, adopted by a vote of 114-18-38 on
See also: Resolutions 54/54G; 55/33C; 57/59; 58/51.
UNGA Resolutions encouraging full-scope safeguards in
Calls upon the African States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons4 that have not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the Treaty, thereby satisfying the requirements of article 9 (b) of and annex II to the Treaty of Pelindaba when it enters into force, and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997.
Resolution 58/30 (2003).
See also: Resolutions52/46; 54/48; 56/17.
UNGA Resolutions on full-scope safeguards in the
“2. Calls upon all countries of the region
[
“Establishment
of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the
See also: UNGA Resolutions 52/34; 52/41; 53/74; 53/80; 54/51; 54/57; 55/30; 55/36; 56/21; 56/27; 57/55; 57/97; 58/34; 58/68; 59/63; 59/106.
The
Ministers reiterated the support for the establishment in the
Final
Document, XIV Ministerial Conference of
See also: similar statement in Final
Document, meeting of NAM Heads of State or Government,
“The States parties call on the nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA . . . The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of full-scope safeguards ...”.
Working Paper
Presented by Members of the Non-Aligned Movement to the 1999 Preparatory
Committee Meeting of States Parties to the NPT, 27 April 1999.
“The States Parties call on the nuclear weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA . . . The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of full-scope safeguards ...”.
Working Paper
Presented by Members of the Non-Aligned Movement to the 1998 Preparatory
Committee Meeting of States Parties to the NPT, 28 April 1998.
Report of UN
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel (2005)
28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards.
A more secure world:
Our shared responsibility, Recommendation 28.
Actions by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
“At their meeting in Warsaw on April 3, 1992, the Adherents to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines . . . have adopted following policy on full scope safeguards as a condition of future nuclear supplies:
(a) The transfer of nuclear facilities, equipment, components, material and technology as referred to in the export trigger list of the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (see INFCIRC/254), should not be authorised to a non-nuclear-weapon State unless that State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful nuclear activities.”
“Statement on Full-Scope
Safeguards,” Meeting of Adherents to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines,
* * *
“Safeguards”
“4. (a)
Suppliers should transfer trigger list items to a non-nuclear-weapon State only
when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA
requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special
fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities.”
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Revision of NSG London Guidelines of 1977),
INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1/Mod. 1,
July 1993,
* * *
“ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES”
“Whether the recipient state is a party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . and has an IAEA safeguards agreement in
force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities.”
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use
Equipment, Material, and Related Technology, INFCIRC 254/REV.3/PT.2,
* * *
“. . . the NSG decided in 1992:
“[para 15] . . . to make a fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA a condition for the future supply of trigger list items to any non-nuclear weapons state. This decision ensured that only NPT parties and other states with fullscope safeguards agreements could benefit from nuclear transfers.”
16. The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) of the fullscope safeguards policy already adopted by the NSG in 1992 clearly reflects the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear nonproliferation commitments and obligations.
“The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its origins, role and
activities,” INFCIRC/539,
US Domestic Law
[In accordance with
Sec. 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, all