Centrifuge R&D: Unresolved Issues

Unresolved Issue

IAEA October 1997 Consolidated Report

Subsequent IAEA Reports

Foreign Sources of Centrifuge Assistance

October 1997 report, p. 21, 78: "It will be necessary to gain access to Iraq's foreign source of information in order to have the opportunity to verify Iraq's explanation that only limited exploratory design work had been undertaken."

IAEA subsequently interviewed the "foreign source." He claimed to have produced only 18 carbon-fiber centrifuge cylinders for the Iraqis, as opposed to their claim that he had produced all 50 such cylinders that they had possessed. IAEA interviewed Iraqi centrifuge technicians and concluded that their story was more credible, and the foreign source had likely supplied all 50 cylinders. (April 1998 report, 25-26)

Iraqi Documents on Centrifuge R&D

October 1997 report, p. 39, sec. 1.2.3: "Very little technical documentation is available to support Iraq's description of its work on gas centrifuge enrichment technology. There are very few technical reports and not one single example of an official programme report coded in accordance with the system described in the FFCD. However, Iraq has made available to the IAEA a large number of technical drawings from which it has been possible to understand the progression of the design of various types of centrifuge machines considered in Iraq's development programme."

October 1997 report, p. 41: "It is, however, relevant to note that only a few examples of the centrifuge drawings Iraq has obtained from the ex-MAN employees have been made available to the IAEA and that the drawings contain only minor details."

October 1997 report, p. 47, sec. 1.2.6: "Iraq's post-war efforts to conceal all centrifuge related documentation, the extent of its knowledge and the associated facilities and sites greatly complicated the IAEA investigations, particularly since much of the centrifuge documentation was stated to have been destroyed during the period when it was continually being moved from one hiding place to another. It cannot be ruled out that some documentation and some centrifuge components are still being deliberately withheld. In this context it is relevant to record that of the drawings and specifications provided by the ex-MAN employees, Iraq has handed over only a few relatively trivial examples to the IAEA."

October 1997 report, p. 93, Attachment 4, table on inspection #29, October 1995: "The Iraqis admitted to having almost a complete set of drawings of a 3 metre long supercritical [centrifuge] machine, and had incorporated building modifications at EDC in the eventuality of this machine becoming available."

Not mentioned in subsequent IAEA reports. Have these drawings been turned over to the IAEA?

October 1997 report (S/1997/779): IAEA, Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), October 8, 1997.

December 1997 report (S/1997/950): IAEA, Notes of the International Atomic Energy Agency briefing to the Security Council on 24 November 1997, December 3, 1997.

January 1998 report (S/1998/38): IAEA, Report on the International Atomic Energy Agency technical team visit to Iraq, 19 to 21 December 1997, January 23, 1998.

April 1998 report (S/1998/312): IAEA, Fifth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), April 9, 1998.