Reforming U.S. Nuclear Laws and Policies

The 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) requires the U.S. to renegotiate its nuclear-cooperation agreements with other nations to strengthen U.S. controls over U.S.-origin, weapons-usable materials. However, nearly from the start, the Executive Branch has sought to ignore or circumvent key non-proliferation requirements in renegotiating these agreements.

Our institute has played a leading role in challenging the legality of nuclear-cooperation agreements that the U.S. has negotiated with other nations over the past decade. Beginning with a Federal lawsuit by a number of members of Congress that we organized in 1982,1 we have challenged provisions in these agreements that give long-term U.S. consent for the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel to extract plutonium. In 1987, majorities of the Senate and House foreign affairs committees, as well as the U.S. Comptroller General, agreed with our legal analysis and wrote to President Reagan that a proposed nuclear agreement giving Japan unrestricted reprocessing rights was unlawful and should be renegotiated.2 Reagan refused, and the agreement came into force.

Now, the U.S. arrangement with the European Union---the U.S.-EURATOM nuclear-cooperation agreement---is due to expire at the end of 1995 without a new agreement yet approved to take its place. A new agreement is supposed to comply with all provisions of the non-proliferation act, including a requirement for U.S. consent over the re-transfer and use of U.S.-origin nuclear equipment, materials and technology. But the present draft of the agreement, like the final agreement with Japan, effectively waives these U.S. "consent rights." In this case, however, unrestricted use of U.S.-origin plutonium and HEU would not be restricted to a single country but would extend to an expanding, changing and unpredictable European Union.

In making the non-proliferation case against the agreement, we will be stressing that if it is approved in present form, weapons-usable, U.S.-origin materials may soon be in Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary---all of which have applied for membership in the European Union. Our immediate objective is to seek renegotiation of the agreement to make it conform with US law before it is submitted to Congress. We will seek rejection of the final agreement if it violates US law.

Our Institute is engaged in a major effort to inform Congress and the public about this issue. We are preparing and will widely circulate legal and policy analyses, pointing out the importance of establishing effective controls on U.S.-exported nuclear material in EURATOM---where plutonium use is being legitimated and from where it is likely to spread. We will work on a bipartisan basis with non-proliferation specialists on Capitol Hill to spell out the options for a new nuclear cooperation agreement with EURATOM.

End Notes

2. Letter to President Reagan from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 17, 1987; letter to President Reagan from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 21, 1987; Comptroller General of the United States, "Legal Memorandum: Review of the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation," B-230201, February 29, 1988.Back to document

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