Regional Approaches

We are monitoring developments in the Middle East and South Asia where the actual presence of undeclared nuclear weapons make them potential nuclear hot spots. Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons continue to be a provocation in its region. Iran is of special concern since the U.S. accuses it of taking a page out of Iraq's book by exploiting the NPT to acquire nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful program. The recent disclosure that Iraq had diverted safeguarded, bomb-grade uranium from its research reactors for a crash program to build nuclear-weapon components makes clear the danger of permitting civilian commerce in atom-bomb materials. In South Asia, another war between India and Pakistan could be a nuclear one because they now both possess unacknowledged nuclear warheads. We are leading the opposition to a Senate-passed amendment that would restore U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan before Pakistan agrees to cap its nuclear weapons program. We monitor regional situations closely, remaining alert to any opportunities to help defuse nuclear rivalries.

Our institute made a substantial contribution to the 1991 accord between Argentina and Brazil to end their nuclear arms race and open all their nuclear facilities to mutual and international inspection. Two years earlier, we organized a conference in Montevideo at which top Argentine and Brazilian nuclear officials and diplomats interacted with American experts we had assembled.1 The central issue was how a nuclear accord, arising out of an ongoing defusing regional rivalries and tensions, could be made mutually and internationally verifiable. A number of approaches hotly debated at the meeting---such as allowing outside verification of bilateral inspections and agreeing to forego production of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium---were incorporated into the final agreement.2

We are now exploring how the Argentine-Brazilian model might be applied to East Asia and whether another Montevideo-type meeting could be helpful in establishing such an accord in that region. East Asia bears close watching because of North Korea's suspected nuclear-weapons program, the persistent concerns in the region about the military potential of Japan's plutonium program, and the past efforts by South Korea and Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. Plans by Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to establish nuclear-power programs, while China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan plan to expand theirs at a rapid rate, make East Asia the world's fastest growing nuclear region with high proliferation risk.

We have had discussions with diplomats in the region who expressed interest in pursuing the concept of a Montevideo-type meeting. Because of the trend toward rapid nuclearization in East Asia, there may be some interest in the region in exploring alternative energy options---high-efficiency, clean fossil and solar-based sources---as a way of avoiding the high cost and proliferation potential of nuclear. We plan to make an exploratory trip to the region, building upon our extensive contacts in Japan and among senior officials in neighboring countries, to evaluate whether such a conference is feasible at this time and would be useful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

End Notes

2. Agreement signed by presidents of Argentina and Brazil, Foz de Iguacu, November 28, 1990.Back to document

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