8 October 1997
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter dated 6 October 1997, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General
In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (19963 of 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic requirements for progress reports under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and resolution 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General to submit such consolidated reports every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.
The fourth such report, which is enclosed herewith, consists of part one, which provides a description of the work carried out and discussions held during the period 1 April 1997-1 October 1997, and part two, which provides an overview of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency to date in implementing its obligations under paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
I request that you kindly transmit the enclosed report to the President of the Security Council. I remain available for any consultations that you or the Council may wish to have.
(Signed) Hans BLIX
Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)
1. In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996), adopted on 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic progress reports required under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to submit such a consolidated report every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.
2. The Director General submits herewith the fourth such consolidated report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996).
3. Part one of the report provides a description of the work done by the IAEA, during the period 1 April 1997 to 1 October 1997, in implementation of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), and includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions held between the IAEA and Iraq and the verification activities undertaken by the IAEA, during the reporting period, with respect to the IAEA's review of Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete" declaration. A summary of part one is set out in paragraphs 39 to 44 of the report.
4. Part two of the report provides an overview of the activities undertaken by the IAEA since it began the implementation of its obligations, under paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991), to carry out on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and to destroy, remove or render harmless any nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-usable material, their subsystems and components and any related research, development, support or manufacturing facilities. It was thought that such an overview would be useful to the Security Council. Attachments 1-4 to the report provide detailed supplementary information. A summary of part two is set out in paragraphs 73 to 83 of the report.
I The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of the IAEA were circulated as document S/1996/261 on 11 April 1996, as document S/1996/833 on 7 October 1996 and as document S/1997/297 on 11 April 1997.
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 APRIL 1997 to 1 OCTOBER 1997
5. In the period under review (1 April 1997-1 October 1997), the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) carried out 250 monitoring inspections at some 90 locations, of which 11 inspections were carried out at locations not previously inspected. The total number of ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) inspections carried out to date now exceeds 1,000. The majority of these wore carried out with no prior announcement, and a number of them were conducted in co-operation with the Special Commission (UNSCOM) monitoring groups. No indication of prohibited materials or activities was detected during those inspections. As regards prohibited equipment, the Iraqi counterpart has handed over to the IAEA a number of pieces of weaponisation- related equipment which it had located in response to repeated requests by the IAEA. This equipment is being removed from Iraq.
6. The ninth radiometric survey of Iraq's main watercourses was carried out from 11 to 21 April 1997. The results of this and previous surveys have shown no indication of Iraq having carried out any proscribed nuclear activities, but they have confirmed the sensitivity of the technology by detecting Iraq's permitted use of radioisotopes in medical applications.
7. Other NMG activities included interviews of key personnel formerly employed in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme; the equipping of the NMG environmental sample screening laboratory, located in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre; and, with the support of the Governments of France, Chile and Germany, the reintroduction of aerial radiometric surveys. The aerial radiometric survey was carried out in May over a period of 17 days and included more than 20 locations covering an area of more than 140 square kilometres. With the assistance of member States, the IAEA continues to improve the capabilities of its OMV activities by the introduction of improved technology, with particular regard to improved equipment for aerosol sampling and fixed-point and land vehicle-based radiometric surveys.
8. The IAEA and UNSCOM have continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which, in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM, are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of joint IAEA/UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at "capable" sites on a regular basis continues to contribute to the effectiveness of the OMV to detect any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by Security Council resolutions. Since the adoption of this IAEA initiative, in 1996, more than 40 inspections at "capable" sites - mostly co-ordinated by the IAEA - have been conducted by joint IAEA/UNSCOM teams. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities has been detected. Other joint UNSCOM/IAEA activities have included investigations of procuromentrelated matters and document examination.
9. The NMG also completed the second of its two-phased verification of activities in connection with Iraq's declared destruction and concealment of material and equipment related to its clandestine nuclear programme. The first phase of these verification activities involved searches at three sites to the south of Lake Tharthar, using sub-surface sensing technologies provided and implemented by a supporting member State, which facilitated the location, excavation and identification of buried items (particularly metallic items). The material and equipment recovered at the Tharthar sites originated from Iraq's past gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programmes. The number and nature of items found appear to be consistent with the statements made by Iraq in its '"Full, Final and Complete Declaration" of its nuclear programme (FFCD). As previously declared by Iraq, the bulk of the recovered equipment had been destroyed. However, there was also a large number of specialised, high- value, corrosion resistant valves which wore in "as new" condition. According to the Iraqi counterpart, these valves had been purchased for potential use in centrifuge cascade circuits.
10. The second phase of the search and excavation activity was completed in May with the survey of nine other sites. The activity at three sites consisted of post-excavation surveys to verify that no materials remained buried at the sites. The principal site in this category was the Tuwaitha Fire Station burial site. The material and equipment at this site were removed in April 1997 and identified by the Iraqi counterpart as ancillary equipment belonging to electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) development projects. The material and equipment found at the Tuwaitha Fire Station burial site is considerably less than Iraq has stated to have been buried at that location. Consequently, Iraq was asked to continue the search and to locate certain items which, though general purpose in nature, comprise, inter alla, components of systems for the conversion of uranium which are proscribed under annex 3 of the IAEA's OMV plan. The Iraqi counterpart extended the search area around Tuwaitha and has located and made available many such items, most of which had evidently been destroyed, as had been declared by Iraq. The activity at the six other sites consisted of both survey and excavation. At one of those sites (Al Amil Liquid Nitrogen Plant), the excavation revealed a small number of previously undeclared EMIS components.
Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration"
11. On 7 September 1996, Iraq submitted what it considered to be the definitive version of the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD-F) of its clandestine nuclear programme, as required by paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 707 (1991). This version was produced following discussions between the IAEA and the Iraqi counterpart in May and June/July 1996 and included annexes detailing equipment and procurement-related matters. FFCD-F was reviewed by the IAEA, in consultation with member State experts, and by letter of 13 January 1997, the Iraqi counterpart was notified of the need for a number of additions and revisions to the declaration.
12. The Iraqi counterpart's response, by a letter of 27 January 1997, was discussed in a series of meetings held in Iraq in February 1997. In these meetings it was agreed that the Iraqi counterpart would provide a consolidated list of additions and revisions which, after review by the IAEA, would be
incorporated into the text of FFCD-F. By a letter of 26 February 1997, Iraq provided a "consolidated list", which was reviewed, again in consultation with member State experts, and was discussed with the Iraqi counterpart during an IAEA technical team visit to Iraq from 16 to 22 May 1997. In addition to the discussion of specific technical matters, the Iraqi counterpart was advised that, while FFCD-F had set out to describe in detail what had been constructed, procured and operated within Iraq's nuclear programme, the document would benefit greatly from the inclusion of a section describing the practical and theoretical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, with particular respect to the capabilities developed by the end of the programme.
13. As a result of these discussions, the Iraqi counterpart provided, on 9 July 1997, a number of revisions and additions, which were further disclosed during an IAEA technical team visit to Iraq from 19 to 24 July 1997. The revisions and additions resulting from the July discussions were received by the IAEA during the period 3 to 14 August. They do not include the summary of achievements referred to above.
Technical team visit, 16 to 22 May 1997
14. As reported above, a technical team of IAEA personnel and member State experts visited Iraq from 16 to 22 May 1997 to review Iraq's additions and revisions to FFCD-F. The discussions with the Iraqi counterpart addressed a number of technical questions and the role of the General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat) in clandestine procurement. However, it focused primarily on presentations that the Iraqi counterpart had been asked to make on three subjects which continued to be of concern to the IAEA, namely:
- The evolution of Iraq's strategy for the protection, concealment, salvaging and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment, documents and buildings related to its clandestine nuclear programme. The counterpart was asked to cover the details of the ac tual removal, transfer, concealment, destruction and redistribution of materials and equipment as outlined in the annex to FFCD-F.
- The progress in the design and development of the Iraqi nuclear weapon after the version reported in Petrochemical Project 3 (PC-3) Report 821, Revision 5, dated 14 July 1990, and the post-war plan to misrepresent the mission of the A1 Atheer nuclear weapons development and production facility.
- The evolution of the abandonment of the former nuclear weapons programme.
The IAEA had previously asserted that official documentation must exist recording the dissolution and reassignment of the facilities and resources of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. In response, the Iraqi counterpart had provided a number of documents to this effect. The counterpart was asked to provide, through its presentation, fuller explanation and additional documentation to support its declared abandonment of the programme. In this latter regard, it had also been expected to obtain an understanding of the objectives, scope and duration of the assumed attempts by the late Lt. General "Hussein Kamel and his group" to sustain the nuclear programme beyond
April 1991. However, the Iraqi counterpart claimed to be unable to provide any information regarding the objectives of Hussein Kamel.
15. In discussions on clandestine procurement, the Iraqi counterpart initially stated that Mukhabarat had played no role in these activities. However, when presented with documented examples of the Mukhabarat's involvement, the Iraqi counterpart agreed to investigate the matter and provide a further response. In returning to the subject in later discussion, the counterpart explained that the Mukhabarat had been involved in clandestine procurement activities, but that its role had been so minor that it had been forgotten. The counterpart further explained that out of a total of some thirty procurement contracts routed through the Mukhabarat's front company, ''Technical Consultations Company", only seven had been fulfilled. Summary information on these consignments was provided to the IAEA.
16. In associated discussions about the handling of solicited and unsolicited offers of foreign assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, including the role played by the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi counterpart stated that Petrochemical-3 project (PC-3) had adopted a policy of avoiding foreign assistance, believing that the risk of exposure (e.g., through "sting" operations) far outweighed the likely technical benefits. The counterpart stated that it was unable to recall any offers of significant assistance and was told that this matter would be raised again in the future.
17. The presentations resulted in considerable discussion, although little new information was forthcoming. Nonetheless, the Iraqi counterpart undertook to use the input from the discussions to expand and correct the addenda to FFDC-F describing the movement, concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment, buildings and documentation. The IAEA was also provided with copies of additional orders and decrees establishing and defining the mission of the facilities that resulted from the dissolution of PC-3.
18. Following from the discussions on the presentations and other technical matters, the Iraqi counterpart also agreed to provide further modifications to the text of FFCD-F and also undertook to make a serious attempt to locate and make available: the equipment formerly assigned to departments 40B and 40G of PC-3 Group 4 (weaponisation); PC-3 reports relating to indigenously produced uranium melting furnaces and the study on the feasibility of falsely representing the Al Atheer weapons plant as a materials characterization centre; facility-specific inventories of materials and equipment handed over to and recovered from military authorities in connection with concealment and unilateral destruction activities; and data indicating the stage of development of weapons components at the time the programme was abandoned.
19. In addition, the counterpart was asked to provide information regarding the inauguration, mandate, membership, authority and duration of operation of the Governmental Committee that had been referred to, during the first presentation, as having been established, inter alia, to 'ireduce the effect of NPT violation to the minimum".
Technical team visit 19 to 24 July 1997
20. In its communication of 9 July 1997, the Iraqi counterpart provided written responses in partial fulfillment of the aforementioned agreed actions, and indicated its readiness to discuss the remaining items. Consequently, a technical team of IAEA personnel and member State experts visited Iraq from 19 to 24 July 1997. The technical team had two objectives. The first was to seek clarification of the additions and revisions to the FFCD-F that had been provided by the counterpart. The second was to seek to ascertain that:
- Iraq had abandoned, rather than merely interrupted, its clandestine nuclear programme.
- Iraq had provided comprehensive information with respect to its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme. its nuclear weapon design and its achievements in associated technologies.
- Iraq had explained the full extent of foreign assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme, including the role of intelligence services in procuring assistance, information, materials, and equipment.
- Iraq had provided a comprehensive explanation of the extent and objectives of its concealment practices.
- Iraq is no longer concealing equipment, materials and documentation from the IAEA.
21. The Iraqi counterpart had achieved a significant measure of success in completing its undertaking, made in May 1997, to locate the equipment formerly assigned to Departments 40B and 40G of PC-3 Group 4 (weaponisation). The equipment located was made available for IAEA inspection at the A1 Shakili store where it had been accumulated, having been retrieved as a result of an extensive search at many facilities. The IAEA agreed to give priority to its assessment of the equipment recovered and to indicate remaining items which needed to be found.
22. On the other hand, the Iraqi counterpart reported lack of success in locating the requested PC-3 reports. However, the counterpart provided a verbal explanation of a report relating to the planned indigenous production of a uranium melting furnace based on electron-beam technology. The counterpart also expanded upon its earlier explanation of the pamphlet that had been produced to support the misrepresentation of the A1 Atheer facility which had resulted from the study recorded in the missing PC-3 report - "Feasibility of the Material Center". The Iraqi counterpart stated that the pamphlet provided an accurate summary of the missing report.
23. The Iraqi counterpart was able to produce a 62 page computer print- out detailing the items of material and equipment, essentially from PC- 3 Group 2 and Group 3, that had been handed over to the Special Guard in early 1991 and those items (approximately 70% of the total) which had been recovered subsequently from the destruction evacuation and storage sites and made available for inspection by IAEA teams following the visit of the high-level mission in
June 1991. These data substantiate the summary information contained in a letter dated 13 September 1991 from Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Industry and Military Industrialisation, to his supervising Minister Lt. General Hussein Kamel, a copy of which was provided to the IAEA by the Iraqi counterpart in November 1995. These data do not, however, cover the fate of materials and equipment formerly belonging to PC-3 Group 4 located in Al Atheer and that of the uranium centrifuge enrichment group (EDC).
24. With respect to the achievements of the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme, the Iraqi counterpart maintained that its primary objective had been to exploit the tested, prototype single cylinder model, and that all resources had been directed toward this objective. The counterpart reiterated that the small amount of work that had been done with a view to exploiting the design drawings of super-critical two-cylinder and multi-cylinder centrifuge designs had been a "spare time" study, which had achieved little of consequence. It was explained that this study had been biased towards the more complex, multi-cylinder, design simply because there were more design details available for that machine. The Iraqi counterpart reaffirmed that, although it would have eventually sought to exploit higher efficiency centrifuge designs, the primary goal had been the large-scale exploitation of the single cylinder machine, which it considered to be a proven design. The counterpart further stated that the modifications which had been made to buildings at Al Furat and EDC Rashdiya ware very much forward-looking and should not be taken to imply that hopes of early exploitation of multi-cylinder centrifuge designs had been seriously entertained.
25. The Iraqi counterpart stated that it had been unable to locate any additional documentation that might have indicated the extent of development of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies at the time of programme abandonment. The counterpart volunteered an explanation of the sequence of drawings of moulds for the casting of explosive lens components, but was unable to provide a verifiable explanation of the missing drawings. Attempts made by the counterpart, during the visit of the technical team, to locate the drawing register, which should have recorded the title of each drawing, ware also declared to be unsuccessful.
26. A summary, prepared by the IAEA, of information previously provided by the Iraqi counterpart relating to the re-assignment of facilities formerly belonging to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme was discussed and the counterpart undertook to provide copies of further orders and decrees that were necessary to substantiate the stated re-assignments.
27. A revised chronology prepared by the Iraqi counterpart of the actions taken by Iraq in connection with the collection, concealment, flnilate-al destruction and eventual relocation of material and equipment was discussed in detail and the Iraqi counterpart undertook to further clarify the information. The draft of a similar chronology regarding documentation was also tabled. It was agreed that this document would be further reviewed by the counterpart before it was provided to the IAEA.
28. During the meeting concluding the technical talks in July 1997, the IAEA identified same 15 technical matters, of varying significance, requiring action
by the Iraqi counterpart. By a letter of 1 August 1997, the IAEA notified the Iraqi counterpart of five areas of concern with respect to which it considered that further information should be made available, namely: the development, over time, of Iraq's strategy for concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment and documentation, including the role of the Governmental Committee; the extent of external (foreign) assistance to the clandestine nuclear programme; the final achievements in the design of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies; the chronology of the abandonment of the clandestine nuclear programme; and post ceasefire covert procurement activities. By this same letter, Iraq was reminded of the observation, made during the May 1997 technical talks, that the FFCD would benefit greatly from a section describing the practical and theoretical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, with particular respect to the capabilities developed by the end of the programme.
29. In the period 4 August to 16 September 1997, Iraq issued a series of 24 letters responding to these matters. In most instances the written responses contained little new information but provided a helpful collation of previously reviewed information. In one critical area, Iraq was able to provide copies of correspondence which, if genuine, provide strong corroboration of Iraq's description of the status as of the end of 1990 of its work to develop explosive lenses. Iraq also provided written authority to the IAEA to take possession of and dispose of materials and equipment for the production of gas centrifuge carbon fibre composite cylinders, currently detained in Jordan. Iraq has also undertaken to provide information regarding its post-war procurement modalities.
30. Although providing substantial revisions and additions to previously supplied information regarding the concealment and unilateral destruction of materials, equipment and documentation, Iraq has not explained the development, over time, of the underlying strategy for such actions, but has stated simply that its activities in this regard wore ad hoc reactions to rapidly changing situations. Similarly, Iraq has not provided a clear and comprehensive statement of the role of the Governmental Committee declared to have been established in June 1991 and charged, inter alla, to '"reduce the effect of NPT violation to the minimum". Furthermore, Iraq has stated that it has declared all aspects of external assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme, and has declined to provide the proposed additional FFCD section describing the practical and theoretical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.
31. Iraq continues to claim that it is unable to shed light on the motives of 'Hussein Kamel and his group" in concealing the materials, equipment and documentation handed over to IAEA/UNSCOM at the Haider House farm in August 1995"
Declarations under the OMV plan
32. Paragraph 22 and annex 2 of the OMV plan (document S/22872 Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.l) require Iraq to provide semi-annual declarations in January and July on the current use of facilities, installations and sites, including those formerly involved in its clandestine nuclear programme and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and location of materials, equipment and radioisotopes identified in annexes 3 and 4 of the plan.
33. With the co-operation of the Iraqi counterpart, further progress has been made regarding the content and accuracy of these declarations. In particular, the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) responded to the IAEA request to include supplementary information on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The supplementary information, which also includes detailed descriptions of the current usage of the declared equipment and materials, is intended to assist the IAEA in improving the efficiency of its monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.
34. The IAEA has evaluated the declarations received in July 1997 and will follow up, with the Iraqi counterpart, requirements for further improvements to the accuracy and completeness of the declarations in the course of its routine OMV activities.
35. Iraq has not yet advised the IAEA of its enactment of penal laws to enforce the prohibition on all natural and legal persons under Iraq's jurisdiction or control from undertaking anywhere any activity that is prohibited for Iraq by relevant Security Council resolutions or by the IAEA's OMV plan, as required pursuant to paragraph 34 of the IAEA's OMV plan.
Release, relocation and change of use of equipment, material and facilities
36. In the period under review, the NMD submitted twenty-nine requests to the IAEA for approval of the release/relocation of equipment and materials or of the change of use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission. Twenty-seven of the twenty-nine requests have been approved. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.
37. The export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, jointly administered by UNSCOM and the IAEA, has, since October 1996, received notifications of some 50 transactions involving the intended export to Iraq of items identified in the Annexes to the respective OMV Plans. None of these notifications involved items identified in annex 3 of the IAEA OMV plan.
38. As previously reported, during discussions on the occasion of the visit of Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, to IAEA Headquarters on 7 March 1997, the Director General raised the subject of Iraq's requirement to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the NPT. In a letter, addressed to the Director General and dated 1 May 1997, Iraq's Foreign Minister, wrote:
'... I am pleased on this occasion to reaffirm once again the obligations of the Republic of Iraq without limitation or condition under the NPT and full compliance with the agreement signed with the IAEA on the safeguards regime."
39. The IAEA continues with implementation of its OMV plan and has embarked upon a programme to update the technology used in its monitoring activities. This has already resulted in the implementation of sub-surface sensing techniques and the further development of routine aerial and land-based radiometric surveys. Work in other areas of technology is being actively pursued with the help of member States.
40. In the course of discussions, the Iraqi counterpart has provided a response to IAEA questions but, from the IAEA perspective, the questions were often construed as narrowly as possible and responses addressed only inaccuracies or omissions that the IAEA had specifically identified in the text. This minimalist approach has resulted in the expenditure of considerable additional time and effort, for all concerned, to produce improvements to FFCD-F. More detailed consideration of the matters reported in paragraphs 11 to 31 above are included in part two of this report and summarised in paragraphs 73 to 83.
41. In response to IAEA requests, the Iraqi counterpart has invested considerable effort in the provision of equipment and personnel resources to support IAEA search and excavation activities to locate and verify the status of materials and equipment declared by Iraq to have been destroyed, either as a result of the Gulf War bombardment or by Iraq's unilateral actions. Also, with the co-operation of the Iraqi counterpart, further progress has been made, in the content and accuracy of Iraq's six-monthly declarations under the OMV. In particular, the July 1997 declarations include supplementary information, requested by the IAEA, on current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The IAEA is evaluating the most recent declarations and will identify requirements for further improvements.
42. The 1 May 1997 letter from Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs resulting from his discussion with the Director General is understood by the IAEA to reflect not only Iraq's unconditional reaffirmation of its obligations under the NPT, but its acceptance of its obligations, as interpreted by the IAEA, under Iraq's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.
43. The IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification activities carried out since April 1997 have not revealed indications of the existence in Iraq of prohibited materials or activities. As regards prohibited equipment, the Iraqi counterpart has handed over to the IAEA a number of pieces of weaponisation-related equipment which it had located in response to repeated requests by the IAEA. This equipment is being removed from Iraq.
44. In carrying out its activities in Iraq, the IAEA has benefited from the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations Special Commission and, in particular, from the generous support of certain IAEA member States which have
provided technical persounel resources, access to advanced technologies and access to information.
OVERVIEW OF IAEA ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE IDENTIFICATION AND DESTRUCTION, REMOVAL AND RENDERING HARMLESS OF IRAQ'S CAPABILITIES RELATED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
45. In paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council decided that Iraq shall unconditionally agree: not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities; and to submit to the Secretary- General and the Director General of the IAEA within fifteen days a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all such items.
46. It further decided that Iraq shall unconditionally agree: to place all of its nuclear-weapon-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA; to accept urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified; and to accept the IAEA plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with those undertakings.
47. In paragraph 13 of that same resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA: to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of Iraq's nuclear weapons or nuclear-weaponusable material or any related subsystems or components or any related research, development, support or manufacturing facilities; and to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council.
48. The Director General was also requested to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the date of adoption of the resolution. As will be readily understood from the following paragraphs, it was not possible for the IAEA to follow such a timetable, primarily because Iraq chose to follow a course of denial, concealment and obstruction, rather than meeting its obligation to provide, at the outset, the declaration foreseen by resolution 687.
49. On 18 April 1991, Iraq submitted to the IAEA a declaration that it had no nuclear weapons or materials or equipment or facilities of the nature defined in
paragraph 12 of the resolution. The IAEA, in a letter dated 19 April 1991, advised Iraq that it was obliged to declare all fissionable material which could be used in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device, including separated plutonium, uranium enriched to 20` or more in the isotope U235 (highly enriched uranium) and U233. It further advised Iraq that it was also obliged to declare facilities such as those for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel or for the separation of plutonium from uranium, or installations for the separation of isotopes of uranium, as well as any research programmes or supporting manufacturing facilities related to such activities.
50. On 27 April 1991, Iraq submitted a selective declaration of its inventory of nuclear material which was limited to the material previously declared by Iraq pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This declaration included some nuclear material which was not weapon-usable but did not include much larger amounts of other non-weapon-usable nuclear materials which had been clandestinely acquired or produced.
51. Iraq's declaration also listed 23 buildings on the Tuwaitha site of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the uranium yallowcake production facility at Al Qaim. However, the declaration failed to include the uranium dioxide and uranium tetrachloride plants at A1 Jesira, the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) uranium enrichment facilities at Al Tarmiya and A1 Shargat, the nuclear weapons development and production facilities at A1 Atheer and A1 Qa Qaa and the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities at A1 Rashdiya and A1 Furat or any of the engineering, manufacturing and support facilities.
52. It was against this background that the IAEA commenced its first on-site inspection campaign on 15 May 1991.
53. Since the commencement of the first on-site inspection campaign, in May 1991, the IAEA has, with the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and supporting member States, carried out twenty-nine such campaigns involving more than 500 facility inspections, in which many facilities were inspected several times, utilising more that 5,000 person-days of technical staff and support staff resources (see attachment 4). In addition, the IAEA has carried out a series of five inspections aimed at the review and verification of Iraq's re-issued "Full, Final and Complete" declaration (FFCD) of its clandestine nuclear programme - required of Iraq resulting from the revelations following the departure from Iraq of the late Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan A1 Majid and issued in draft form in February 1996.
54. As a result of the IAEA's inspection activities, a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme has evolved revealing a programme aimed at the production of an arsenal of nuclear weapons, based on implosion technology, which had involved:
- Acquisition of non-weapon-usable nuclear material through indigenous production and through overt and covert foreign procurement.
- Research and development programmes into the full range of uranium enrichment technologies culminating in the industrialisation of EMIS and the demonstration of a proven prototype gas centrifuge.
- Development of metallurgical technologies necessary for the fabrication of the uranium components of a nuclear weapon.
- Research and development activities related to the production of plutonium, including laboratory-scale reprocessing of irradiated nuclear material and reactor design studies.
- Development of nuclear weapon designs and weaponisation technologies for implosion devices and the establishment of industrial-scale facilities for their further development and production.
- Research and development activities related to the integration of a nuclear weapon with a missile delivery system.
55. Understanding of the details of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme has been severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope and achievements. The most extreme example of this policy was Iraq's initial endeavour to conceal the programme in its entirety by removing and concealing tell-tale equipment and materials from the sites involved. The stripping of EMIS equipment from Tuwaitha and Tarmiya and denying IAEA access to the concealment locations at Abu Grahib and Falluja typified this effort. Even after Iraq's revised declaration of 7 July 1991, issued after the Falluja confrontation, Iraq continued to deny the actual mission and achievements of the Al Atheer nuclear weapons development and production facility, as well as the actual location of the gas centrifuge development facility.
56. Iraq's revised declaration of 7 July l991 included reference to its research and development activities involving the recovery of plutonium from the reprocessing of nuclear material irradiated in the IRT-5000 research reactor. Subsequent inspection confirmed that there had been three reprocessing campaigns, carried out in the hot cells of the radio-chemical laboratory at TuwaiLha, and that some five grams of plutonium had been recovered. This activity was complemented by project 182, which aimed at the design and indigenous construction of a 40 MW natural uranium/heavy water research reactor and would have provided the basis for a capability to produce and separate substantial amounts of weapon-usable plutonium.
57. Of immense assistance to the uncovering of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme was the large cache of documentation obtained during the sixth and seventh on-site inspection campaigns, carried out between 22 September and 22 October l991. These documents provided a comprehensive insight into that part of the programme which had been developed under the code name Petrochemical Project 3 (PC-3). Although, on 23 September, Iraq had forcibly removed the bulk of these documents from IAEA custody for a period of about six hours, during which time, according to Iraq's later statement, it had cataloqued the reports and removed all documents relating to PC-3 Group 4 (weaponisation), the IAEA had been able to secure a number of documents which provided incontrovertible
evidence that the real mission of the A1 Atheer facility was the development and production of nuclear weapons. Since August 1995, Iraq has provided to the IAEA a large amount of programme documentation, but it remains unclear whether all of the documents removed by the Iraqi counterpart on 23 September 1991, have been subsequently handed over to the IAEA.
58. Nothing related to the gas centrifuge programme was found in the documentation cache, even though Iraq claimed that the programme had been co-located with PC-3 at TuwaiLha. Iraq offered the explanation that the centrifuge programme had been separately managed and funded and that its records had been separately stored and, like all other programme records, were being destroyed in the time-frame of the IAEA-6 inspection campaign. Iraq also maintained that no political decision had been made to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons and persisted with its claim that the actual mission of the Al Atheer facility was that of a materials study centre.
59. Despite Iraq's prevarication, the IAEA carried out a comprehensive campaign of destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the practical assets of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. This campaign involved the extensive destruction of buildings and equipment at the EMIS sites at Tuwaitha, A1 Tarmiya and A1 Sharqat, and at the nuclear weapons development and production sites at A1 Atheer and A1 Qa Qaa; of the laboratory-scale reprocessing facilities at Tuwaitha; and of gas centrifuge related materials, components and equipment. In total, more than 50,000 square metres of facility floor space were destroyed by explosives and more than 1,900 individual items and 600 tons of sensitive alloys, useful in a nuclear weapons programme or in uranium enrichment activities, were destroyed or rendered harmless (see attachment 3).
60. Those destruction and rendering harmless activities, which were essentially completed by November 1992, were complemented by the removal from Iraq of all known nuclear-weapon-usable nuclear material and the removal to the IAEA's Vienna headquarters of same specialised equipment. The removal of the nuclearweapon-usable nuclear material was accomplished in two phases, with the unirradiated and lightly-irradiated material being removed in three consignments during the period November 1991 to June 1992, and the more complex task of removing the irradiated material being accomplished, in two consignments during the period December 1993 to February 1994.
61. In the autumn of 1992, work commenced to phase in ongoing monitoring and verification activities as typified by the commencement in September of that year of the baseline sampling for the now routine twice-yearly hydrological survey of Iraq's major watercourses.
62. On-site inspection activities and discussions with the counterpart continued to focus on gaining a better understanding of Iraq's achievements in weaponisation and in the development of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology. Many attempts were also made to persuade the counterpart to provide meaningful information on procurement and on foreign assistance to its centrifuge design achievements. Despite Iraq's many promises of co-operation, these matters remained at an impasse until, as a result of a series of highlevel talks held during the period August 1993 to October 1993, Iraq finally
agreed to provide procurement information and, most notably, to identify the sources of foreign assistance to the centrifuge programme.
63. These revelations enabled the IAEA to confirm member State information on Iraqi procurement and to identify the source and procurement strategy for the consignment of 100 tonnes of maraging steel which had been destroyed by Iraq in April/May 1991 and further adulterated under IAEA supervision in November 1992. Of substantial importance was Iraq's explanation of its acquisition of gas centrifuge design information, including the identification of the foreign nationals involved.
64. Although progress was made in the verification of procurement transactions, little further advance was made in mapping the scope of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme until September 1994, when, following up on member State information, the IAEA (inspection campaign IAEA-26), after a series of discussions and facility inspections, obtained an admission from Iraq that an exploratory programme to examine laser isotopic separation (LIS) technologies had been established in 1981. The programme, which had been assigned to the laser group within the Physics Department of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (Tuwaitha), was stated to have continued, without success, until 1987, when it had been relegated to a 'watching brief". The expert opinion within IAEA-26 was that Iraq's explanation of its LIS activities was plausible but surprise was expressed that Iraq had not undertaken the relatively simple step of vaporising uranium metal (see attachment 1, sect. 1.2.5).
65. In August 1994, concurrent with inspection campaign IAEA-26, the IAEA commenced its continuous presence in Iraq through the establishment of its Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG).
66. In the aftermath of the August 1995 departure from Iraq of the late Lt. General Huesein Kamel, Iraq released additional information regarding its weaponisation and gas centrifuge enrichment programmes and revealed the existence of a plan in August 1990 to divert the safeguarded research reactor fuel to accelerate, through a "crash programme", Iraq's attainment of nuclear weapons. At the same time Iraq admitted that the actual mission of the Al Atheer facility had been the development and production of nuclear weapons, and confirmed that the Rashdiya site of the Engineering Design Centre had been the headquarters of the gas centrifuge enrichment programme since its establishment in 1987. The information released by Iraq included a large cache of documentation comprising PC-3 technical reports, engineering drawings, records of meetings and procurement correspondence, which was handed over to UNSCOM and later to the IAEA, at the Haider House farm - a property stated by Iraq as having belonged to the family of Hussein Kamel.
67. Two inspection campaigns (IAEA-28 and IAEA-29) ware mounted, in September and October 1995, respectively, to review the information revealed by Iraq. In the course of these inspections it became evident that Iraq had made significantly more progress than previously declared in the development of the implosion package, largely through efforts at the Al Qa Qaa establishment; had accumulated more experience in uranium metallurgy than previously admitted; was, in January 1991, ready to commence the recovery of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the safeguarded research reactor fuel; and had begun work to
accelerate the integration of the nuclear weapon with a missile delivery system. In the course of these inspections Iraq released further documentation, most notably an optical disc containing electronic copies of many documents related to the work of PC-3 Group 4 (weaponisation). Since these inspections Iraq has continued to provide additional documentation, some of which was provided spontaneously and some in response to IAEA questioning.
68. The re-examination of the scope and achievements of the gas centrifuge enrichment programme was also addressed during these inspection campaigns and further clarification was obtained with respect to the extent and nature of foreign assistance. The Iraqi counterpart withdrew earlier explanations it had devised to protect the sources of foreign assistance, and revealed that many drawings and specifications relating to centrifuge machines had been provided, some of which concerned advanced technology, multi-cylinder machines. It was also learned that Iraq had planned to build a third centrifuge facility at a location in south Taji which would have accommodated cascade halls of up to 1,000 machines and, which according to the Iraqi counterpart, would have been the site of a future commercial scale UF6 production facility.
69. Iraq's rapidly developing programme for the design, development, manufacture and operation of gas centrifuge machines was not, according to the Iraqi counterpart, matched by a similar high priority plan for the secure supply of production-scale amounts of UF6 - the basic feed material. Iraq has declared its laboratory-scale UF6 production capacity to have been more than adequate to support the ongoing development activities in 1990 and considered that there was no urgency to provide for large-scale production.
70. Since October 1995, the IAEA has been reviewing the Haider House farm cache to evaluate Iraq's statements and, on the basis of this and other activities, has removed from Iraq a number of single-purpose items and secured for eventual destruction or rendering harmless quantities of aluminium and maraging steel and other equipment and materials.
The scope and status of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme
71. The results of the IAEA's on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities have, over time, produced a picture of a very well-funded programme aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon.
72. The programme, which is described in greater detail in attachment 1 to the present report, comprised:
- Indigenous production and overt and covert procurement of natural uranium compounds. In this regard:
All known indigenous facilities capable of production of amounts of flranJum compounds useful to a reconstituted nuclear programme have been destroyed along wi th their principal equipment;
All known procured uranium compounds are in the custody of the IAEA;
All known practically recoverable amounts of indigenously produced flranJum compounds are in the custody of the IAEA.
Industrial-scale facilities for the production of pure uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment. In this regard:
All known facilities for the industrial-scale production of pure Uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment have been destroyed, along with their principal equipment.
Research and development of the full range of enrichment technologies culminating in the industrial-scale exploitation of EMIS and substantial progress towards similar exploitation of gas centrifuge enrichment technology. In this regard:
All known single-use equipment used in the research and development of enrichment technologies has been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless;
All known dual-use equipment used in the research and development of enrichment technologies is subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification;
All known facilities and equipment for the enrichment of uranium through EMIS technologies have been destroyed along with their principal equipment.
Design and feasibility studies for an indigenous plutonium production reactor. In this regard:
IAEA inspections have revealed no indications that Iraq's plans for an indigenous plutonium production reactor proceeded beyond a feasibility study.
Research and development of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology. In this regard:
The facility used for research and development of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology was destroyed in the bombardment of TuwaiLha and the process-dedicated equipment has been destroyed or rendered harmless.
Research and development of weaponisation capabilities for implosion-based nuclear weapons. In this regard:
The principal buildings of the A1 Atheer nuclear weapons development and production plant have been destroyed and all known purpose-specific equipment has been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.
A "crash programme" aimed at diverting safeguarded research reactor fuel and recovering the HEU for use in a nuclear weapon. In this regard:
The entire inventory of research reactor fuel was verified and accounted for by the IAEA and maintained under IAEA custody until it was removed from Iraq.
English Page 20 Summary
73. The Security Council, in resolution 687 (1991), envisaged that, within fifteen days of adoption of the resolution, Iraq would submit to the Director General of the IAEA a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 12 of the resolution. It further envisaged that the IAEA would carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission, and that the Agency would develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items listed in paragraph 12 of the resolution. The IAEA was expected to commence to carry out that plan within forty-five days after its approval by the Security Council.
74. It was not possible for the IAEA to follow such a timetable, primarily because Iraq chose to follow a course of denial, concealment and obstruction, rather than meeting its obligation to provide, at the outset, the declaration foreseen by resolution 687. The initial declarations provided by Iraq wore totally inadequate and the IAEA's access to designated inspection sites was obstructed. Following the visit to Iraq in July 1991 of a United Nations/IAEA high-level delegation and the personal intervention of the Secretary-General, Iraq modified its initial approach and provided a considerably expanded, though still incomplete declaration. However, Iraq continued to conceal and deny aspects of its weaponisation and centrifuge enrichment activities until the revelations which followed the August 1995 departure from Iraq of the late Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel. Since that time, Iraq has been more forthcoming in providing information, although it still continues to limit the scope of information provided in response to IAEA questioning in an effort to understate the capabilities developed within the clandestine nuclear programme.
75. In connection with its technical team visits, since May 1997, the IAEA has received clarification of many matters raised with the Iraqi counterpart. While containing little new information, Iraq's written statements provided a helpful collation of previously reviewed information. In one critical area, Iraq was able to provide copies of correspondence which, if genuine, provide strong corroboration of Iraq's description of the status, as of the end of 1990, of its work to develop explosive lenses. However, the Iraqi counterpart: has not provided a comprehensive written statement of the membership, terms of reference and duration of authority of the Governmental Committee charged, inter alia, to ''reduce the effect of NPT violation to the miniumum"; has stated that it has no further information regarding external assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme; has declared itself unable to describe the motives behind the actions ascribed to the late Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel which resulted in the concealment of the cache of documentation, material and equipment "discovered" at the Haider House farm; has declined to include, in its FFCD a summary of the practical and theoretical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme; and has yet to provide the promised written description of its post-war procurement system.
76. Iraq's lack of co-operation has required the IAEA to follow a protracted and painstaking process involving on-site inspections, collection and analysis of procurement information and follow-up of other information provided by member
States. The results of the IAEA's investigation have over many years yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.
77. Although certain documentary evidence is missing and some gaps in knowledge remain, the following can be stated with regard to Iraq's clandestine programme:
- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the programme was interrupted.
- Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.
- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more that a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.
- All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its "crash programme", was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.
- There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
78. Iraq's description of its development of the single-cylinder sub- critical gas centrifuge is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available documentation and the status of the related facilities. Although little documentation is available, it is clear that Iraq had intentions to exploit the information in its possession regarding multi-cylinder, super- critical centrifuge machines. It will be necessary to gain access to Iraq's foreign source of information in order to have the opportunity to verify Iraq's explanation that only limited exploratory designwork had been undertaken.
79. There are no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which has evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in Iraq's FFCD-F issued on 7 September 1996, as supplemented by the written revisions and additions provided by Iraq since that time. However, taking into account the possibility, albeit remote, of undetected duplicate facilities or the existence of anomalous activities or facilities outside this technically coherent picture, no absolute assurances can be given with regard to the completeness of Iraq's FFCD. Some uncertainty is
inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. The extent to which such uncertainty is acceptable is a policy judgement.
80. Most of the IAEA activities involving the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme which to date have been revealed and destroyed, were completed by the end of 1992 (see attachment 3). Since that time, only a relatively small number of items of proscribed equipment and materials have been identified and disposed of, most of which were handed over to the IAEA by Iraq since the events of August 1995. While no indications of the presence of further proscribed equipment or materials in Iraq have been found, the IAEA, despite its extensive inspection activities, cannot, for the reasons described in the previous paragraph, provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation.
81. The IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan was phased-in during the period from November 1992 to August 1994, at which time it was considered to be operational. Taking into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, the OMV plan is predicated on the assumption that Iraq retains the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future.
82. Implementation of the OMV plan has not resulted in the detection of any indications of ongoing proscribed activities or the presence in Iraq of proscribed equipment or materials apart from the items referred to in paragraph 80. It should be recognised, however, that OMV measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable proscribed activities, such as computer-based weaponisation studies or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. Iraq's direct acquisition of weapon-usable nuclear material would also present a severe technical challenge to the OMV measures and great reliance must be placed on international controls.
83. As indicated in the foregoing, the IAEA's activities regarding the investigation of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme have reached a point of diminishing returns and the IAEA is focusing most of its resources on the implementation and technical strengthening of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The IAEA is not "closing the books" on its investigation of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and will continue to exercise its right to investigate any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, in particular, through the follow-up of any new information developed by the IAEA or provided by member States and assessed by the IAEA to warrant further investigation, and to destroy, remove or render harmless any proscribed items discovered through such investigations.
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