1. In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051, adopted on 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic progress reports required under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit such a consolidated report every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1995.

2. The Director General submits herewith the sixth such consolidated report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996).

The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of the IAEA were circulated as document S/1996/261 on I I April 1996, as document S/1996/833 on 7 October 1996, as document S/1997/297 on 11 April 1997, as document S/1997/779 on 8 October 1997 and as document S/1998/312 on 9 April 1996. Document S/1998/694, dated 27 July 1998, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/1998/11 dated 14 May 1998.

page 2


Monitoring inspections

3. In the period under review (1 April 1998 - 1- October 1998), the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) carried out 243 monitoring inspections at some 137 locations, of which 37 inspections were carded out at locations not previously inspected. The number of inspections carried out under. the IAEA's ongoing, monitoring and verification (OMV) plan since the NMG was established in August 1994 now totals almost 1,540. The majority of these inspections were carried out with no prior announcement; a number of them were conducted in co-operation with the monitoring groups of the Special 'Commission (UNSCOM). No indication of prohibited materials, equipment or activities was detected during these inspections.

4. Until 5 August 1998, the IAEA and UNSCOM continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of inspections at "capable sites" on a regular basis contributes to the effectiveness of the OMV plan in its ability to detect any attempt to conduct activities prohibited by Security Council resolutions. The current number of inspections at "capable sites" totals some eighty-five. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities has been detected in the course of these inspections.

5. On 5 August 1998, Iraq announced that it was suspending its co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Although the IAEA received no formal notification or explanation from Iraq of the suspension of co-operation, it obtained the following information through contact with the Director General of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate:

Iraq will continue-to facilitate OMV inspections at sites for which Iraq routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan.

page 3

Iraq will continue to allow IAEA access to locations for the purpose of the collection of environmental samples or for carrying out rad iation surveys.

Iraq will not permit access to "capable sites" or Indeed to any sites other than those for which Iraq routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan.

Iraq will not cooperate in any activity involving investigation of its clandestine nuclear programme.

6. The IAEA OMV plan, which Iraq formally accepted on 26 November 1993, obliges Iraq to accept unconditionally all of the rights of the IAEA enumerated in the plan. The rights include, inter alia, full and free access at any time to all sites, facilities, areas, locations, activities, material and other items, including documentation, all persons and all information which, in the Agency's judgement, may be necessary for its OMV activities. Iraq's restriction of monitoring inspections to pre-defined sites limits the IAEA's right of full and free access. As a consequence, the IAEA is unable, through "capable site" inspections, to ensure that prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq, free from the risk of detection through direct inspection measures. Iraq's refusal to address any matters related to its clandestine nuclear programme constitutes a further limitation of the IAEA's right of full and free access, specifically to information. Thus, the IAE A is unable to investigate further its remaining questions about Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The OMV plan is an integral whole which can only be meaningfully implemented in its entirety. Iraq's suspension of co-operation significantly reduces the effectiveness of OMV and the level of assurance provided through ongoing monitoring and verification.

Other OMV activities

2. on 24 September 1998, the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group was denied access to the Al Iraqi factory. The facility was originally announced to the IAEA in February 1995 and has been inspected on eight previous occasions, Iraq has not been asked to provide routine six-monthly declarations for this facility.

page 4

7. The eleventh radiometric survey of Iraq's main watercourses was carried out from 14 to 28 April 1998. The results of this, and previous surveys have shown no indication of Iraq having carried out any prohibited nuclear activities, but, as previously reported, they have confirmed the sensitivity of the technology by detecting Iraqs permitted use of radioisotopes in medical applications.

8. Routine interviews of key Iraq personnel have continued, but difficulties have been encountered In locating some personnel due to their stated transfer from Government jobs to the private sector. Actions are in hand with the Iraqi counterpart to maintain a register of the places of work of key personnel. The interview process Is further complicated by Iraq's current suspension of co-operation with the IAEA which, inter alia, has included instructions to Iraqi personnel not to respond to any questions relating to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.

9. The third helicopter -gamma survey campaign of former Iraq! nuclear-related installations was carried out from 20. May to 12 June 1998. The 19-98 campaign included overflights o f sites known to have been -involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme as well as test flights to verify the technical performance of the sensor system in various configurations. For the first time near-real-time analysis capabilities were available permitting investigation and resolution, by follow-up inspections on the ground, of anomalies detected during flights. Sites overflown in both 1997 and 1998 showed no statistically significant measurement differences from year to . year which might indicate undeclared activities.

10. Work continues on the updating and expansion of the technological components of OMV activities and procedures. Efforts are also underway to consolidate a number of technical measures into a wide area environmental monitoring programme. In this regard. Iraq is providing the necessary practical and technical support, particularly 'in connection with the IAEA's installation and operation of air sampling equipment.

page 5

Declarations under the 0MV Plan

11. Paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the OMV plan (Document S/22872 -Rev. 1 and Corr, 1 (1991)) require Iraq to provide semi-annual declarations, in January and July, on the current use of certain facilities, installations and sites, including those formerly involved in its clandestine nuclear programme, and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and location of materials, equipment and isotopes identified in Annexes 3 and 4 of the plan.

12. Iraq's declarations of nuclear material transactions and inventories covering the period I January 1989 to 31 December 1991 were reviewed in detail with the counterpart to further clarify nuclear material flows and inventories at the principal locations at which nuclear material was used or stored during that period. The Iraqi counterpart has provided revised data which appear to take into account many of the r equested clarifications, but some inconsistencies remain to be resolved.

13. Based on the IAEA's evaluation of the declarations received in July 1998, there remains outstanding the repeatedly requested implementation by Iraq of quality assurance measures to deal with generic problems regarding accuracy, completeness and internal consistency. In this connection, members of the IAEA Action Team will visit Iraq in October 1998 to discuss the adequacy of Iraq's July 1998 declarations and to clarify the remaining inconsistencies in Iraq's nuclear material declarations. IAEA experience indicates that the goal of accurate and complete declarations will only be achieved if Iraq assigns additional, technical personnel resources to this task.

Release, relocation and change of use of equipment, material and facilities

14. In the period under review, Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate submitted twenty-seven requests to the IAEA for approval of the release/relocation of equipment and materials or of the change of use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission. Twenty-four of the twenty-seven requests have

page 6

been approved and three are awaiting the provision. of additional Information by the Iraqi counterpart. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verificabon at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

Export/Import Mechanism

15. The export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, jointly administered by UNSCOM and the IAEA has, since October 1996, received notifications of some 190 transactions involving the intended export to Iraq of items identified In the Annexes to the respective OMV plans. Seven of these notifications Involved items identified in Annex A of the IAEA OMV plan.

The adoption by Iraq of measures to implement its obligations

16. Paragraph 34 of the IAEA OMV plan requires that Iraq adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and to enact penal laws to secure enforcement of those measures. In July 1998 discussions with the leader of the IAEA Iraq Action. Team, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz stated that Iraq acknowledged the requirements to adopt the necessary measures and to enact the penal laws, and that it planned to satisfy the requirements before October 1998. No notification has been received to date of Iraq's progress in this regard.


17. As reported in detail in the progress report dated 8 October 1997 (document S/19071779), and based on all credible information available to date, the IAEA's verification activities in Iraq, have resulted in the evolution of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. These verification activities have revealed no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective of producing nuclear weapons or that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material or had

Page 7

clandestinely acquired such material. Furthermore, there are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for t he production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. In February 1994, the IAEA completed the removal from Iraq of all weapon-usable nuclear material - essentially research reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards.

18. In document S/1997/779, the IAEA further reported that there were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and the information contained in Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD). The report, however, referred to some. elements of uncertainty in the completeness of that picture because of the inevitable limitations of any countrywide verification process. The report also indicated that these verification process limitations were not helped by Iraq's lack of full transparency in the provision of certain information and the absence of certain documentation.

19. As previously stated, greater transparency by Iraq would contribute considerably to, clarifying the few remaining questions and concerns relevant to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Specific areas are the provision of certain documentary evidence of Iraq's actual technical achievements in nuclear weapon design and centrifuge development, the identification and location of the foreign national allegedly involved in an offer of assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, and the provision of concrete evidence of the timing and modalities of its abandonment of that programme, including the adoption of the measures and the enactment of the penal laws referred to in paragraph 16 above.

20. It should, however, be noted that the uncertainties resulting from the above questions and concerns would not, of themselves, prevent the full implementation of the IAEA OMV plan., Indeed, such elements of uncertainty are factored into the plan, which takes fully into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material, The plan is also predicated on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge and technical expertise to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any

page 8

relevant materials; or technology to which it might gain access in the future. Nonetheless, it must be reoognised that Iraq's direct acquisition of weapon-usable material would present a serious technical challenge to OMV measures. and great reliance must continue to be placed on international controls.

21. To be effective, ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions, must be comprehensive and intrusive. The OMV plan is an integral whole which can only be meaningfully implemented in its entirety. Its effective implementation is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the IAEA's rights of full and free access enshrined in the plan.

22. The IAEA continues to allocate most of its resources to the implementation of its OMV plan and to strengthen the technical content of its activities under the plan. However, Iraq's current suspension of co-operation with the IAEA limits the IAEA's right to full and free access. The IAEA is currently unable to investigate further any aspects of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme or to. ensure, through "capable site" inspections, that prohibited activities are not being carried, out in Iraq, free from the risk of detection through direct inspection measures. As a result the level of assurance provided under the plan is significantly reduced.

23. Should Iraq recommence full co-operation with the IAEA there would be no impediment to the full implementation of the IAEA's OMV plan and, as part of that plan, the further investigation of the few remaining, questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme arising out of new information coming to the IAEA's attention. The assessment of Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) remains the prerogative of the Security Council. However, since the inspection techniques and procedures employed by the IAEA both in its monitoring activities and its investigation activities are essentially the same, the scope and content of the IAEA's verification activities in Iraq would be largely unaffected should the Security Council decide that Iraq has complied with its obligations under paragraph 12 of resolution 587 (1991),

page 9

24. Finally the attention of the Security Council is drawn to the eventual need to put into effect a mechanism, based upon paragraph 4 of resolution 699 (1991), to secure long-term funding for the implementation costs of the OMV plans of the IAEA and the Special Commission.

[What's New] What's New         Saddam & Bomb]Saddam & the Bomb         [Home Page]Home Page