Steven Dolley

Nuclear Control Institute

UPDATED: October 18, 2000

Introduction

In 1998, Duke-Cogema-Stone & Webster (DCS), a consortium that includes two Duke Energy affiliates (Duke Power and Duke Engineering and Services), signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to fabricate some 33 tons of plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear warheads into so-called mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in four Duke nuclear power reactors (McGuire 1 & 2, Catawba 1 & 2) and two Virginia Power reactors (North Anna 1 & 2). Plutonium is both a nuclear explosive and a radioactive poison, requiring extraordinary security and safety measures. This past April, Virginia Power withdrew its reactors from the MOX program, a move it described as purely a business decision.

Duke portrays the plutonium MOX fuel program as a patriotic initiative to dispose of nuclear-bomb material that also would economically benefit the company. Public-interest organizations nationwide strongly object to the use of weapons plutonium as fuel in civilian reactors because it poses a significant threat to public safety and the environment, and runs counter to 25 years of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. The proposed use of MOX fuel also presents Duke with hidden costs and financial risks.

MOX fuel may not receive regulatory approval. Federal law requires that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amend the licenses of the Duke reactors to allow MOX use. However, there is no guarantee that such licenses can be granted without severe restrictions on reactor operation. There are significant additional risks to the public associated with use of MOX fuel that will require detailed regulatory scrutiny and may even exceed recently established NRC risk guidelines. For instance, because MOX fuel is inferior to uranium fuel at high burn-up levels (i.e., irradiating or burning the fuel in a reactor for extended periods), NRC may impose limits on MOX burn-up, and thereby require Duke to consume MOX fuel inefficiently compared with the conventional uranium fuel Dukes reactors now use. Also, the use of MOX fuel, which can accelerate aging of some plant components, may interfere with Dukes proposal to extend the licenses of the Catawba and McGuire nuclear power plants for another twenty years of operation.

MOX fuel may end up costing Duke money, rather than generating fuel-cost savings. MOX is several times more expensive than conventional uranium fuel. The cost savings claimed by Duke, if realized, would in fact be hundreds of millions of dollars in government subsidies built into the MOX contract, paid for by federal taxes. But even these savings are only estimates, based upon a complex reimbursement formula. DOE is requiring Duke to negotiate a cap or ceiling on the total amount that Duke can be reimbursed for cost overruns. Given that MOX fuel has never been used on a commercial scale in the United States, and that DOEs projects historically end up costing several times more than originally estimated, Dukes cost overruns might exceed the amount DOE is willing to pay. In addition, the already low costs of uranium fuel may drop even further, making MOX fuel a money loser for Duke. Duke refuses to tell its shareholders how much money it believes it will save, or what additional costs it might incur, claiming that such information is sensitive and confidential. In fact, Duke cannot guarantee any savings at all. In light of the recent NRC report detailing the vulnerability of the McGuire plants ice-condenser containment system, expensive backfits may be required.

MOX fuel poses risks to efficient, economic operation of Duke nuclear plants. Congress and DOE have repeatedly stated that the U.S. MOX fuel program will not be allowed to proceed unless Russia actually disposes of its plutonium as well. But Russia has no money to do so, and will rely solely on funding from the United States and other G-8 nations, none of whom have pledged more than a fraction of the estimated $2.5 billion a Russian MOX disposition program would cost. Such an unreliable plutonium-fuel plan could jeopardize Dukes future competitiveness in a deregulated electricity market because of costly disruptions in refueling schedules due to sudden, unpredictable changes in Russian policies. Duke Power should not link the future of its nuclear-power program to the fate of an unstable Russian government and economy.

MOX fuel requires heavy security. DOE insists that weapons-plutonium MOX fuel must receive the same degree of security as that required for nuclear weapons. This will necessitate greater security expenses at Dukes reactors, including more armed guards who are trained and authorized to use deadly force. These measures could spark controversy for Duke in communities near the reactors.

MOX fuel poses a grave safety threat. Dr. Edwin Lyman, NCI Scientific Director, conducted a MOX fuel safety study using the same computer codes employed by DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Dr. Lymans study concluded that, in the event of a severe accident resulting in a large radioactive release, an average of 25% more people would die of cancer if the reactor were using a partial core of plutonium-MOX fuel, as opposed to a full core of conventional uranium fuel. DOE itself has concurred with many of Dr. Lymans findings. Dr. Lyman also found that the impact of MOX fuel on certain reactor characteristics might also increase the chance that such a severe accident would occur. DOE and Duke dismiss such accidents as extremely improbable---but it must be remembered that the accidents that took place at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and the Tokai nuclear-fuel plant in Japan last September all had been similarly dismissed as highly unlikely or even impossible events.

MOX fuel exposes Duke to potentially enormous future costs. The factories in which plutonium MOX fuel is fabricated are susceptible to problems caused by hold up of significant amounts of plutonium that get caught in process equipment rather than end up in the final fuel product. The Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF), a MOX factory in Japan, accumulated a hold-up of more than 70 kilograms of plutonium during its first several years of operation. International nuclear regulators required Japan to clean out the plant and upgrade its equipment at a total estimated cost of over $100 million. When queried by the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) at a February meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, Duke technical representatives claimed they had never heard of this problem. The PFPF plant was based upon technology from Cogema, the same French company that is designing the MOX plant which will fabricate fuel for Dukes reactors. Duke could therefore confront similar problems and expenses at the DCS consortiums MOX fuel-fabrication factory.

Because plutonium MOX fuel has never been used commercially in the United States and is now generating concerns and controversy in nations where it is being produced and used, Dukes MOX fuel program will be subject to greater scrutiny and possibly a heavier regulatory burden from NRC. For example, recent revelations that British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) cut costs by making up fictional quality-control data for MOX fuel produced for Japanese, German and Swiss utility customers has resulted in those customers canceling orders for MOX fuel. This is likely to result in NRC imposing costly quality-control requirements on MOX fuel fabricated for Dukes reactors.

MOX fuel using warhead plutonium is experimental and untested. Duke claims that many years of experience in European reactors shows MOX to be safe and effective. But the plutonium in European MOX fuel was recovered from used nuclear-power plant fuel, not from nuclear bombs. Warhead plutonium is of a different isotopic composition, responds differently in reactors, and has never been tested on a commercial scale. DOE began test irradiation of a few MOX pellets in an experimental reactor in early 1998, and will not have any results for years. Warhead-plutonium MOX fuel remains an unproven technology with significant risks associated with its use.

MOX fuel violates U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Using plutonium MOX fuel in U.S. reactors would contradict a 25-year U.S. nuclear non-proliferation initiative, begun in the Ford and Carter administrations, to oppose plutonium fuel cycles at home and abroad. The Duke MOX program would encourage Europe and Japan to accelerate programs to recover hundreds of tons of bomb-usable plutonium from the spent fuel of their nuclear reactors, creating a grave proliferation and terrorism risk. Dukes MOX program also would serve as an example to nations in volatile regions (including Taiwan, South Korea, and Iran) to pursue plutonium fuel cycles, risking regional instability by establishing a pathway to nuclear weapons.

MOX fuel is not needed to dispose of plutonium from dismantled warheads. DOE is actually pursuing a dual-track approach to warhead plutonium disposition, and plans to dispose of some 17 tons of plutonium directly as waste by immobilizing it in steel cylinders filled with glassified, highly radioactive waste, instead of turning it into MOX fuel. Technical studies by the National Academy of Sciences and DOE conclude that this immobilization technology is feasible, and could be utilized to dispose of all surplus warhead plutonium in the United States and Russia. Such immobilization could be done at the Savannah River Site utilizing existing high-level waste. There is no arms-control justification for the riskier MOX approach, but it is supported by the nuclear industry as a way to subsidize nuclear utilities at taxpayer expense.

Conclusion

Duke Power is jeopardizing the future viability and economic competitiveness of its nuclear-power program in exchange for possible future savings amounting to only a small fraction of its nuclear-fuel costs. Participation in the MOX program is an imprudent risk that Duke Power should not undertake.

Founded in 1981, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), a nuclear non-proliferation research and advocacy center, opposes the use of weapons plutonium in civilian commerce. For further information about the risks of Duke Powers MOX-fuel program, contact Steven Dolley, Nuclear Control Institute (1000 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 410, Washington, DC, 20036; phone 202-822-8444; mail@nci.org), or visit the NCI website at http://www.nci.org/nci-wpu.htm

Return to What's New Page