The Honorable Hazel O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Secretary O'Leary:

We are writing with regard to implementation of the U.S.-Japan Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation in the wake of the Monju breeder reactor accident in Japan and the likelihood that an even larger surplus of U.S.-origin, Japanese plutonium will result from this major setback to Japan's plutonium program.

Specifically, we wish (1) to inquire whether Japan has requested that the United States agree to add mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities in Europe to the Annex 1 list of approved facilities under the agreement; and, if so, (2) to urge that the Department of Energy not agree to such a Japanese request, given the virtual absence of demand for MOX fuel in Japan.

As you know, the recent sodium-coolant accident has put Japan's Monju fast-breeder reactor Monju out of commission for at least three years. In the wake of this accident, the governors of the three Japanese prefectures containing 60 percent of Japan s nuclear power plants have declared their opposition to any consideration of use of plutonium-uranium MOX fuel in light-water reactors in their prefectures. As a result, Japan's two largest electrical utilities, Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric, are also seriously reassessing their plans for plutonium use, as well as their financial support of the planned Rokkasho reprocessing plant in the face of a doubling of the official cost estimate to about $16 billion.

These developments have created a major change of circumstances in which there is now negligible demand for fresh plutonium fuel in Japan, with the future very much in doubt. Nonetheless, Japanese spent fuel continues to be reprocessed in France and Great Britain, resulting in the separation of many tons of plutonium for which there is no foreseeable use in Japan. It is reasonable to conclude that this extreme mismatch between plutonium supply and demand will result in an already enormous stockpile-11 metric tons of plutonium-growing to 25 metric tons by the year 2000, according to the Japanese Citizens' Nuclear Information Center.

This surplus and the setbacks in Japanese plutonium-use programs represent a fundamental change in the need for plutonium in Japan. Even the current large surplus of plutonium contravenes both U.S. and Japanese non-proliferation policy. President Clinton, in his 1993 non-proliferation policy statement, pledged that the United States would "seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium," and "explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs . . ."1 The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission stated in its 1994 report that "it is necessary to go about nuclear fuel recycling on the basis of the principle of not having plutonium beyond the amount required to implement the program, i.e., the principle of no surplus plutonium . . ."2 Even if Japan does not regard fabricated MOX fuel to be surplus plutonium, it nonetheless is, if there are no reactors licensed to burn it.

Japanese reprocessing contracts have already led to stockpiles of excess plutonium in Europe as well as Japan. The fabrication of MOX fuel for shipment to Japan, where there are essentially no facilities to use it, would aggravate the surplus of plutonium in Japan and exacerbate the condition that the U.S. and Japan have pledged to avoid. Such a surplus would prove particularly volatile in Northeast Asia, where concerns about the size of Japan's plutonium program are widespread and where the U.S. has expended much diplomatic effort to persuade North and South Korea to give up their own plutonium programs.

Given this situation, we are deeply concerned that Japan nonetheless may have already requested, or may soon be seeking, U.S. approval for designation of one or more MOX fabrication plants in Europe to the Annex 1 list of facilities to produce MOX fuel from U.S.-origin plutonium for use in Japan. We urge in the strongest terms that any such request be rejected by the Department of Energy because any additional return of plutonium to Japan at this time would increase the already large stockpile of surplus weapon-usable plutonium there and, therefore, would be inimical to U.S. common defense and security, and contrary to the President's non-proliferation policy.

In a December 1993 letter to the Nuclear Control Institute, John Keliher, then Director of the Office of Intelligence and National Security, wrote that "[w]hen such a request is received, it will be handled as a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act. As required by this section, the subsequent arrangement will be analyzed to assure that it will not be inimical to the common defense and security. The Department of Energy will submit the analysis of the subsequent arrangement to Congress and a Federal Register Notice will be published."3

Adding MOX facilities to the Annex 1 list at this time would violate a fundamental premise of the U.S.-Japan Agreement. In 1987, long-term programmatic consent was granted for facilities on the Annex 1 list based upon a consideration of plutonium need. Indeed, "[t]he principal consents and approvals contained in the Implementing Agreement apply to facilities listed in Annexes to that Agreement, which were compiled on the basis of a thorough assessment by the U.S. and Japan of the needs of Japan's nuclear program."4 [emphasis added] Plutonium need is still the critical factor in any decision to add facilities to the Annex 1 list. In the absence of such need, a request to add facilities to the list at this time should be denied.

It should be of particular concern that one facility under consideration to be added to the Annex 1 list is not even complete. The Sellafield MOX facility is currently under construction and is not expected to be operable until late 1997. As it is impossible to demonstrate effective safeguards in a facility that does not exist, we oppose consideration of an incomplete facility be added to Annex 1. ACDA took care to mention in its "Analysis of Consents and Approvals"5 that facilities included in the original Annex 1 were "existing facilities." Thus, no facility should be added to Annex 1 of the Agreement which is not in existence and has not been demonstrated to comply with all safeguard requirements.

Instead of acceeding to a request from Japan to add MOX facilities to the Annex 1 list, we ask that you immediately initiate a new assessment of the needs of the Japanese nuclear program and engage Japan in discussions of alternatives to plutonium for meeting its long-term energy security needs.

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. We look forward to your response, and would be pleased to discuss it with you and your staff.

Sincerely,

Paul Leventhal
Nuclear Control Institute

Thomas B. Cochran
Natural Resources Defense Council

Tom Clements
Greenpeace International

End Notes

2. Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy, July 1994, p. 32.Back to document

3. Letter from John Keliher, Department of Energy, to Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Institute, December 3, 1993. Back to document

4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Analysis of Consents and Approvals Agreed Upon in Conjunction with the Proposed New Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," August 1987, p. 29, in Proposed Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, House Document 100- 128, November 9, 1987, p. 319. Back to document

5. ACDA, "Analysis of Consents and Approvals ...," ibid., p. 29. Back to document

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