On February 12, DPRK again refused inspections and declared that economic sanctions would be considered "a declaration of war." However, on February 15, DPRK said it would allow complete inspection of its five declared nuclear sites but would not permit special inspections at the two suspected nuclear waste sites. The U.S. welcomed the move, which was accepted by the IAEA and was sufficient to avert punitive action at the Board of Governors meeting. The U.S. and South Korea also agreed to postpone Team Spirit exercises at least until the fall.

In early March, an inspection team visited DPRK, but was not permitted to take samples or radioactivity measurements from crucial portions of the reprocessing plant. These steps were needed to determine whether reprocessing had taken place since the last full inspection over a year ago (DPRK claimed that it had not). Some seals also showed signs of tampering. In addition, the inspectors found evidence, but were unable to confirm, that DPRK had begun construction of a second, undeclared reprocessing line at the facility, potentially doubling its plutonium-separation capacity. As a result, the IAEA Secretariat informed the Board of Governors on March 16 that it could not verify non-diversion. On March 21, the Board of Governors passed a resolution urging DPRK to permit full inspections, but stopped short of formally referring the matter to the Security Council.

The U.S. threatened economic sanctions if DPRK continued to resist inspections. DPRK responded by accusing the U.S. of driving the situation to the brink of war, and warned that Seoul would be rendered "a sea of fire" if hostilities broke out. On March 31, the U.N. Security Council called upon DPRK to permit full inspections. The call took the form of a non-binding appeal, rather than a resolution, for fear that China would veto stronger action. DPRK rejected the appeal, and said it would resume certain unspecified "peaceful nuclear activities" that it had suspended. Inspectors were eventually allowed to return to Yongbyon and complete the inspection.

In late April, DPRK announced that it would soon begin discharging fuel from its gas-graphite reactor. The IAEA stated that complete access for its inspectors would be imperative during the defueling, to assure that none of the fuel rods were diverted. The Agency also said it would need to take samples of hundreds of the 8,000 rods, to permit analysis that could determine whether more fuel was unloaded (and possibly reprocessed) during the 1989 shutdown than DPRK had declared. DPRK agreed to allow inspectors to view the defueling, but refused to allow the sampling.

Defueling of Reactor Begins

On May 14, DPRK announced it had begun the defueling, despite the fact that IAEA inspectors were still en route and not present to witness it. On May 18, the inspectors confirmed that defueling had indeed begun. On May 27, Hans Blix announced that DPRK had accelerated the pace of defueling, and might soon jeopardize the IAEA's ability to analyze the rods. DPRK refused to suspend defueling, leaving the sampling dispute unresolved. All but two of the inspectors left the country.

On June 3, Hans Blix announced that DPRK had defueled so much of the reactor that it was no longer possible for inspectors to acquire the data they needed to determine the reactor's operating and fueling history. The U.S. began a campaign to garner support for economic sanctions at such time as the issue is again referred to the Security Council, which may occur in the next few weeks.

On June 8, DPRK hinted it might agree to full inspections if the U.S. resumed negotiations. The U.S. rejected this offer, with the State Department claiming that DPRK had "crossed the point of no return" by unloading almost all the fuel from its gas-graphite reactor and thereby destroying evidence needed for the IAEA to determine how much fuel was unloaded in 1989. On June 9, the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated that, if Japan implemented sanctions, DPRK "would regard it as a declaration of war, and Japan would be unable to evade a deserving punishment for it." This threat was apparently intended to reinforce Japan's hesitancy to cut off the flow of funds from Koreans living in Japan to DPRK, the primary North Korean source of hard currency.

On June 10, the IAEA suspended technical assistance to DPRK because of DPRK's continued rejection of full safeguards and inspections. DPRK responded by withdrawing from the IAEA and threatening to kick the two remaining IAEA inspectors out of the country. DPRK also strongly hinted that it was again considering withdrawal from the NPT. These moves were possibly attempts to leverage DPRK's position in talks with former President Jimmy Carter, who was on his way to North Korea at the time.

On June 12, the U.S. announced that South Korea and Japan had agreed to support sanctions, and to urge China to support them, as well. Selig Harrison, a scholar on Northeast Asia at the Carnegie Endowment, returned from DPRK, where he had met with Kim Il Sung. Harrison reported that Kim was willing to "suspend" plutonium reprocessing, to halt construction of a larger reactor, and to maintain IAEA inspections of the spent fuel in exchange for U.S. diplomatic recognition and assistance, including light- water reactors.

Questions and Answers about the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

What is the basis of international concern about DPRK's purportedly peaceful nuclear program?

There are three primary reasons for concern. The first relates to DPRK's continued defiance of IAEA safeguards, its March 1993 withdrawal from the NPT (which it later suspended but never renounced entirely), and its recent withdrawal from the IAEA. DPRK now claims a "unique status" under the NPT as a nation which has withdrawn and then suspended that withdrawal. DPRK claims its unique status allows it to accept some IAEA inspections and safeguards and reject others. Such unique status is neither claimed nor recognized by any other nation.

Second, DPRK's history of military aggression and terrorism, its enormous conventional military capability, and its record as a major exporter of missiles and other conventional arms to the Middle East, all provide a context that makes its nuclear ambitions particularly threatening.

Third, DPRK's choices of technologies for its nuclear program make no economic or technical sense for a nuclear power program, but are perfectly logical for a nuclear weapons production effort. Gas-graphite, natural uranium-fueled reactors similar to DPRK's were the technology of choice for plutonium production in the weapons programs of the five declared nuclear- weapon states. Moreover, DPRK's reactor, operational since 1986, was not connected to electrical generators or power transmission lines until 1992, just prior to the third IAEA inspection.

Perhaps most significant, a civilian nuclear power program in DPRK would have no sensible use for a large plutonium reprocessing plant such as that at Yongbyon. DPRK's justifications for this plant (future development of breeder reactors and waste management) ring hollow, but are legitimized by the NPT and the IAEA. They also parallel those of Japan, whose plutonium program has the approval of the United States. This inconsistency in U.S. policy further complicates nonproliferation diplomacy with the DPRK.

Are there other signs that DPRK is trying to get nuclear weapons?

In December 1992, a planeload of Russian nuclear scientists was stopped on the runway in Moscow, just before taking off for Pyongyang. There have also been unconfirmed reports that 56 kilograms of plutonium may have been smuggled out of the former Soviet Union to North Korea. In the last few years, U.S. intelligence satellites have detected more than 70 pits in the sand banks of the Kuryong River near the Yongbyon nuclear facility. These pits could be evidence of testing of the non- nuclear elements of the triggering package for an implosion weapon. However, it is unclear why DPRK would choose to conduct such tests in the open and near a nuclear research facility, where they would be bound to generate suspicion.

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