THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 6

UNITED STATES NON-PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION POLICY

I have reviewed the interagency report on United States non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation policy and related guidelines, along with the agencies' recommendations, and have approved the policies set forth below.

The United States will:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental security and foreign policy objective.
- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and to promote understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states.
- Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries that have not accepted those treaties.
- View a material violation of these treaties or of an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and United States bilateral relations, and also view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon state with grave concern.
- Strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide for an improved international safeguards regime for cooperation in the areas of nuclear safety and environmentally sound waste management.

 Work more effectively with other countries to forge agreement on measures for combatting the risks of proliferation.

- Undertake prompt efforts to enhance the credibility and reliability of the United States as a responsible nuclear supplier.
- Maintain a strong intelligence collection and assessment capability as an integral part of United States non-proliferation policy and actions pursuant to that policy.

Achieving United States objectives will require making distinctions among states based on the degree of proliferation risk. The United States will cooperate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including civil nuclear programs to meet their energy security needs, under a regime of adequate safeguards and controls.

To provide the basis for further action and decision, I hereby direct that:

- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Department of Energy and other interested agencies, will make a concerted effort with other supplier nations to seek uniform nuclear supply conditions and, in particular, to
 - (a) prevent transfers to non-nuclear-weapon states of any significant nuclear material, equipment, or technology not subject to IAEA safeguards;
 - (b) inhibit transfers of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands;
 - require IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in nonnuclear-weapon states as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment;
 - increase the effectiveness of international nuclear export control lists; and
 - (e) consider multinational undertakings as an alternative to the development of national facilities for reprocessing or enrichment.

 The Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will promptly coordinate action to obtain the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

- [Paragraph blacked out]
- All Executive Branch agencies having responsibilities for determinations or authorizations related to nuclear exports and request under agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation will
 - (a) take steps promptly to ensure that such actions are carried out expeditiously where the necessary statutory requirements are met and that authorization for retransfer of nuclear material or equipment prior to use in reactors is, absent unusual circumstances, decided on by the time an export license is issued;
 - (b) give favorable consideration to requests for the retransfer of spent fuel for reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France if the necessary statutory requirements are met; and
 - (c) consider requests for the disposition or use of plutonium on the merits of each case pending development of further policy on reprocessing and plutonium use.

I also request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission act expeditiously in carrying out its nuclear export licensing responsibility and its consultative responsibilities on other nuclear activities with other countries where the necessary statutory requirements are met.

In addition, I have noted that a number of actions will be undertaken by the Secretary of State in a timely manner and working with the interested agencies. These include, in particular:

 review of what steps might be appropriate, consistent with United States non-proliferation objectives, to facilitate or remove any unnecessary impediments to commercial relations in the field of nuclear energy and review of applicable laws, regulations, and procedures to determine whether changes should be sought;

 work to ensure effective physical protection for nuclear material, to support the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to substitute lower enriched fuels for research reactors at the earliest possible time;

- negotiation of a convention for nuclear safety cooperation and assistance in civil nuclear emergencies;
- [Paragraph blacked out]
- support of ongoing international efforts in the areas of international plutonium storage, spent fuel management, assurances of supply and improved safeguards, particularly for large and advanced nuclear facilities.

The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the interested agencies, shall ensure that adequate capacity is available to provide enrichment services for domestic and foreign customers.

I direct that the Secretary of State, working with other interested agencies, give priority attention to efforts to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance the international non-proliferation regime and, consistent with United States security interests, to re-establish a leadership role for the United States in international nuclear affairs. These decisions do not imply any requirements for additional federal funding.