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The major question now, and the subject of this hearing, is what are Germany's choices for final disposal of its spent nuclear fuel, assuming that MOX use in power reactors is no longer a viable option of the nuclear power industry. Germany's spent fuel decisions will have major repercussions for the future of commerce in civil plutonium around the world.

What are Germany's Spent-Fuel Disposal Options?

In all, there are five basic alternatives for Germany to consider. Each has its potential benefits and liabilities. I will examine each option from a nuclear non-proliferation perspective, and then offer my recommendation.

1. Continue reprocessing; return VHLW to Gorleben; return plutonium as MOX fuel. This option, which represents the current policy, is the least desirable of all. It would help perpetuate global civilian commerce in nuclear-weapon-usable plutonium---only a few kilograms of which are needed to build a bomb that could destroy a city. This option would provide vast amounts of foreign exchange to Cogema and BNFL, and thereby help to sustain the world's principal reprocessors.

This option would perpetuate use of unneeded plutonium without solving the nuclear waste problem. Recycling plutonium in light-water reactors does not solve the nuclear waste problem because such recycling does not "eliminate" plutonium. For technical reasons, plutonium cannot be recycled more than two or three times in light-water reactors.13 At that point, the spent MOX fuel would still require final disposal at Gorleben or elsewhere unless breeder reactors were available to consume the remaining plutonium. But there is virtually no chance that commercial breeders will be available for this purpose. Nor should they be developed, because of the high proliferation and terrorism risks associated with breeder reactors and their fuel cycle.

Perhaps the only benefit of this approach is that it would require the least change in current German fuel-cycle policy. However, recent experience proves that the current policy does not work. Under current political conditions, it may not be possible to make any further waste shipments, either of VHLW or spent fuel, to Gorleben.

2. Continue reprocessing; return VHLW to Gorleben; store or give away recovered plutonium. Some German utilities have discussed with Cogema, the French reprocessing corporation, the possibility of storing indefinitely in France plutonium recovered from German spent fuel, or even giving that plutonium to the French utility, EDF.14 This approach would avoid the problems related to plutonium recycle in German reactors. Such deals might also allow interim storage of VHLW in France, pending a German decision on final disposal of such waste.

This alternative may not prove viable, because French law requires that all VHLW be returned to the nation that contracted to have its spent fuel reprocessed, and that such return cannot be delayed beyond "the technical interval imposed by reprocessing," though that interval is not precisely delineated in the law.15 Also, in exchange for getting rid of their plutonium, German utilities---and ultimately German ratepayers---would be required to subsidize EDF's production of MOX fuel from German plutonium. Given that fabrication of MOX fuel is many times more expensive than fabrication of LEU fuel, the price tag could be many millions of deutschmarks. Moreover, this approach would also perpetuate plutonium commerce, but simply shift the locus of such commerce from German reactors to French reactors.

3. Stop reprocessing; store spent fuel abroad. This alternative has also been discussed by German utilities and Cogema. German utilities might choose to renegotiate some or all of their post-2000 reprocessing contracts to provide for indefinite storage of spent fuel in France, either with reprocessing of that fuel, or with preparation of it for direct disposal, at some future date.16

This approach offers several advantages. If the spent fuel is never reprocessed, the proliferation risks of plutonium recovery and recycle are avoided, as are the other liabilities of using MOX fuel in German reactors. Such an approach would also avoid controversy over VHLW shipments to Gorleben, and if new contracts were concluded for storage of additional German spent fuel, perhaps reduce or eliminate the need to ship spent fuel for interim storage at Gorleben or Ahaus.

Recently, however, Cogema has denied that it has offered indefinite storage of German spent fuel, and that its discussions with German utilities do not involve non-reprocessing options.17 Any interim storage agreement with France would require reprocessing at some point,18 and then the proliferation liabilities of plutonium and political liabilities of VHLW take-back would ensue.

4. Stop reprocessing; store spent fuel at Gorleben and other away-from-reactor facilities in Germany. This alternative would involve sending spent fuel directly to Gorleben and Ahaus. Proliferation liabilities of reprocessing and plutonium recycle would be avoided, and there would be no need to convince France or another foreign party to accept German spent fuel.

However, this option would invite the same sort of violent protests that greeted the recent shipment of the Phillipsburg spent fuel to Gorleben.19 Also, this alternative would soon overload Gorleben's storage capacity. Without reprocessing, the Federal Ministry of Environment and Nuclear Safety estimates a new facility the size of Gorleben or Ahaus would be required every seven years.20 The likelihood of developing even one such new facility is dim, given the unwillingness of the states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria to share in the burden of waste management by hosting it.21

5. Stop reprocessing; continue to store spent fuel onsite at reactors. This option prevents Germany from contributing to or participating in global plutonium commerce. It also defuses at least one aspect of the Gorleben/Ahaus crisis: future near-term shipment of spent fuel to the facilities.

According to SPD and Lower Saxony officials, most German reactors have enough onsite wet storage capacity for another five to seven years.22 The Federal Radiation Protection Agency confirms that, as of last year, 2,152 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) storage capacity---about one-third of the total---remained vacant at German reactors.23 In many if not most cases, therefore, time remains to decide upon, negotiate and implement satisfactory intermediate and long-term solutions.

One promising intermediate-term solution is construction of onsite dry storage capacity. This would avoid the controversy and risk of shipping spent fuel abroad or to Gorleben, and permit reactors to continue operating without exceeding their storage capacity. Onsite dry storage is a straightforward, demonstrated technology, already in use at many reactors in the United States and other nations around the world.24 Also, at an estimated cost of $150 U.S. (around 225 DM) per kilogram,25 onsite dry storage would be at least five times less expensive than reprocessing in France.26

Proposals to expand onsite spent-fuel storage will no doubt prove controversial, but at least the debate about the future of nuclear power would be transformed from violent clashes in the streets and rail lines to re-licensing proceedings in each state with nuclear power plants.

Conclusion

Continued onsite storage of German spent fuel would enfranchise each state to make its own decision about the future of nuclear power. If a given state, say Hesse, is determined to shut down its reactors, it will refuse to make the necessary accommodations for expanding onsite spent-fuel storage. If a state wishes to keep its reactor(s) operating, it will need to arrange for expanded pool space---by re-racking, fuel assembly consolidation, or other means---or construction of onsite dry storage. In this way, onsite spent-fuel storage capacity will become the determining factor in the future of nuclear power in Germany. In either situation, both the democratic decision-making power, and the costs and benefits of the decision rendered, would be in the hands of the governing authorities of each state that hosts nuclear-power plants. This alternative would also buy time for the states and Federal government to negotiate a solution for the final direct disposal of spent fuel in a geological repository.

This option, like the others, is not without its costs and risks. But from a nuclear non- proliferation perspective, continued onsite storage of spent fuel is the best interim solution for the State of Hesse, for the Federal Republic of Germany, and sets the right example for the world at large.

I thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you might have.


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End Notes

13. Report by the Working Party on Physics of Plutonium Recycling, NEA Nuclear Science Committee, Physics of Plutonium Recycling, Volume I: Issues and Perspectives, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 1995, pp. 115-116. Back to document

14. Mark Hibbs, "German Utilities Said Close to Deal on Storage Contracts with Cogema," NuclearFuel, January 15, 1996, pp. 5-6. Back to document

15. Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, "No Confidence German Reactors Can Store Spent Fuel On Site," NuclearFuel, June 3, 1996, p. 8. Back to document

16. Mark Hibbs, "German Utilities Said Close to Deal on Storage Contracts with Cogema," NuclearFuel, January 15, 1996, pp. 5-6. Back to document

17. Ann MacLachlan and Mark Hibbs, "Cogema Denies Reports It Negotiated Long-Term Storage of Used German Fuel," NuclearFuel, June 3, 1996, pp. 8-9. Back to document

18. Mark Hibbs, "German Utilities Said Close to Deal on Storage Contracts with Cogema," NuclearFuel, January 15, 1996, p. 5. Back to document

19. "Gorleben's First Shipment of Spent Fuel," Nuclear News, June 1995, p. 59. About 1,500 protesters were confronted by 5,900 police, with security costs for the shipment totalling 55 million DM ($40 million U.S.). Back to document

20. Mark Hibbs, "Germans Already Feuding Over Future Spent Fuel Storage," NuclearFuel, June 5, 1995, p. 17.Back to document

21. Mark Hibbs, "State Wants Waste Reshuffle After Rioting at Gorleben," Nucleonics Week, May 16, 1996, p. 8. Back to document

22. Mark Hibbs, "After Gorleben: More Reprocessing or Alternative Spent Fuel Storage," NuclearFuel, May 20, 1996, p. 10. Back to document

23. Ibid. However, some portion of this available space must be reserved for safety reasons to preserve the option of unloading a full core on a temporary basis. Back to document

24. C. K. Anderson, "Interim Spent Fuel Management: 1995 Update," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1995, pp. 28-29. Back to document

25. Ibid.Back to document

26. Based on a reprocessing price of 5,000 French francs per kilogram heavy metal (about $750/kg) under Cogema's post-2000 reprocessing contracts with German utilities. Mark Hibbs, "End to Reprocessing of German Fuel Could Save Utilities Over $2- billion," NuclearFuel, April 11, 1994, p. 5. German utility sources estimated in 1994 that savings from complete cancellation of Cogema reprocessing contracts "would save a net DM 3.5 billion." Ibid.Back to document